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5Preface
I am really excited about the release of the findings of the extensive research 
on Farmer Producer Companies (FPCs) conducted by Professors Richa Govil and 
Annapurna Neti of Azim Premji University, ably assisted by Madhushree Rao. 
We at SRIJAN set up and ran several Farmer Producer Organisations (FPOs), we 
thought pretty successfully - one FPO’s annual turnover repeatedly touched five 
crore rupees transforming the local rural economy (a number of households own 
gas cylinders now), and another FPO innovated on processing a highly perishable 
fruit and ended up trebling the price which tribal women received from local 
traders. But one question remained: Were these going to be sustainable people-
governed and people-managed institutions? 
Government agencies such as NABARD and SFAC, too, asked us to make FPCs in 
new locations and geographies. We did so given our grassroots work on water and 
livelihoods. But, were these sound strategies? 
The collaboration between SRIJAN and Azim Premji University started in 2017, 
when SRIJAN conducted a short workshop on FPOs for MA Development students 
at the university. Success of this collaboration led me to think about extending 
it further.  Richa, Annapurna and I talked about a study on FPCs in light of our 
mutual interest in seeing FPOs succeed, and the fact that government agencies 
such as NABARD and SFAC were enabling formation of a large number of FPOs, 
the majority of which were being registered as FPCs. Much water had flown down 
the Ganges since the whole idea of FPCs was floated in 2002 as a new legal form of 
organising farmers under the Companies Act, arguably less cumbersome and with 
less government control (though with substantial government support), and was 
enthusiastically welcomed by the government and NGOs alike.  Some questions 
needed to be revisited however in light of increasing compliance requirements, 
and more critically Goods and Services Tax (GST). 
 
In hindsight, it was a good decision on the part of Azim Premji University and 
SRIJAN to have launched the study, and I sincerely hope that it will contribute to 
better policy formulation and implementation on the ground.
 
I complement Richa, Annapurna and Madhushree for coming out with practical, 
succinct recommendations.
Ved Arya
Founder, Self Reliant Initiatives through Joint Action (SRIJAN)
Founder and Director, Buddha Fellowship Program
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7Foreword
Scholarly work in the broad area of co-operative organisations in the non-financial 
sector has suffered in the recent times because of want of disaggregated data 
necessary for studying organisations that work on the principle of mutuality. There 
is a lot of talk and much discussion that goes on under the generic classification of 
Farmer Producer Organisations (FPOs), but we have to realise that an FPO could 
actually be incorporated as a co-operative society (and could federate under the 
same law), as a Mutually Aided Co-operative Society (in States that have passed a 
liberal co-operative law on the principles of mutuality) and as a Farmer Producer 
Company (FPC) under the Companies Act. However, under each of these buckets, 
there has been no data released by the State. RBI used to release the annual 
statistics of co-operatives under the series “Statistical Statements Relating to the 
Co-operative Movement in India” in two buckets: Credit Co-operatives and Non-
Credit Co-operatives. After National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development 
(NABARD) was carved out of the Agricultural Refinance division of the Reserve 
Bank of India, the data on non-credit cooperatives was published by NABARD for 
a few years and later discontinued. Multiple references have been made to the 
need for integrating the returns that the respective organisations file with their 
respective regulators, but data and numbers are just not available. Thus our 
understanding of this sector has been on the basis of patchwork consolidation 
done by organisations, sectoral studies, case studies of individual organisations 
and documentation of practices.
In this context, the work of Annapurna Neti and Richa Govil which uses publicly 
available (non-classified) data and brings together a comprehensive and 
authoritative document on one sub-set of the Farmer Producer Organisations – 
the Farmer Producer Companies is very welcome. This gives us the broad numbers 
of how these organisations have grown over the years, their geographical spread, 
investments in these organisations, their activity profile, etc. Putting together this 
data should not have required painstaking efforts, but should have been available 
as a base document in a portal on an annual basis – like banking statistics – so that 
scholars could use that as a starting point to do more incisive studies and help in 
policy formulation. However, the authors deserve all the credit for putting these 
numbers and classifications together so that it forms a base for future discussions 
that we may undertake on Producer Companies.
In addition to presenting to us the data on FPCs, the authors have provided some 
qualitative insights into how these organisations are managed, members’ sense 
of ownership as well as the textured relationships that the members have with 
their organisations. Much of the co-operative literature in the past lamented on 
the interference by the State that vitiated the autonomy of co-operatives and 
the concept of mutuality. With more than 7,000 FPCs which are designed on the 
principle of mutuality, it provides a great base to examine what makes these 
organisations tick. Since the investment in these companies is completely member 
8driven, it is expected that the members would have a greater sense of ownership 
and stakes. However, the authors seem to suggest that the layered relation does 
not naturally make them believe that the members’ stake result in a sense of 
ownership. This is an interesting insight that needs to be examined in greater 
detail. The role of the intervening organisations that help farmers set up these 
companies, needs to be examined as well.
I hope that recognizing the utility of this report, the government – particularly 
the Ministry of Corporate Affairs will make this data available in a searchable 
format and in a format that is available for consolidation. All that this would 
need is a good set of codes to be developed to classify the organisations into 
their functions, regions/geography, ownership etc. I also hope the organisations 
like NABARD with their increased focus on FPOs will pay attention to generating 
data and make it available to scholars. I am confident that this important work 
will form a base and provide insights for further work on producer companies by 
governments, NGOs and researchers.
I thank the authors for giving me the privilege of having a look at this report before 
its publication. I wish them well.
M.S. Sriram
Professor, Centre for Public Policy
Indian Institute of Management Bangalore
9Executive Summary
The Producer Companies Act 2002 was pioneering 
in its vision of combining the principles of collective 
action with the structural benefits of a company. 
It was predicated on the belief that producer 
companies (PCs) would enable small producers 
to pool their resources and establish successful 
businesses which would improve their incomes and 
reduce risks in the long run. And, as member-based 
institutions, they would be inherently embedded in 
local communities and have the potential to become 
strong local institutions of marginalised producers.
Over the last 17 years, thousands of PCs have 
been registered in India, engaged in a wide range 
of activities such as bulk procurement of inputs, 
aggregation of produce, value-addition and 
marketing. We undertook a study of PCs in India to 
(i) analyse the characteristics of producer companies 
in India, (ii) investigate their strategic challenges, 
capitalisation, internal governance, regulation, and 
long-term potential, and (iii) recommend possible 
strategies for improving the viability of producer 
companies.
For this purpose, we constructed a comprehensive 
and robust dataset of all PCs registered in India 
up to March 31, 2019. We also conducted over 100 
in-depth interviews of stakeholders involved in 
promoting and supporting PCs including farmer-
shareholders, board of directors, CEOs and 
management of 24 PCs across 8 states as well as 
government and non-government organisations.
Producer companies face several challenges such 
as weak sense of ownership among producer-
shareholders, undercapitalisation, inadequate 
business skills, poor governance and the lack of an 
enabling ecosystem. We found that these challenges 
are partly a result of incongruities in stakeholder 
imaginations of the purpose of producer companies.
In order to improve the likelihood of PCs’ success, 
we recommend promoting them in a two-tier model 
comprising multiple supplier PCs and one market-
facing company in each block or district (depending 
on the number of small producers). It is vital that 
supplier PCs and individual farmers own a significant 
stake in the market-facing company and have strong 
representation on its board to ensure alignment with 
interests of small producers. It is equally important 
for the market-facing company to be invested in the 
success of supplier PCs. It would also be advisable 
to simultaneously fund and develop a business 
ecosystem to support producer companies by 
encouraging local entrepreneurship for providing 
support services to PCs. Such an approach allows 
producer companies to attract greater capital and 
skilled talent, and generate higher turnover, profits 
and member loyalty. 
Producer companies should be made explicitly 
eligible for government schemes available to 
individual farmers and their collectives. Policy-
makers should further support producer companies’ 
growth by simplifying compliance processes, 
instituting differential regulation, protecting the 
rights of vulnerable shareholders and enabling 
external investment through a different class of 
non-voting shares (with appropriate safeguards and 
limits). The geographical disparities in PC promotion 
should be addressed by promoting PCs in the most 
backward districts with the largest numbers of small 
producers. 
Currently there are 7374 producer companies 
covering over 4.3 million small producers in the 
country. These numbers are expected to more than 
double over the next few years, covering almost 10% 
of all agricultural households in India. Strengthening 
the long-term viability of producer companies has 
the potential to improve the life and livelihoods of 
millions of small and marginal producers across the 
country. 
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Distribution of 
producer companies 
registered in India as of 
March 31, 2019
50+10-490-9
PCs Registered
• ~50% of PCs are in just 4 states
• ~25% of PCs are in just 20 districts
• Pune has 185 PCs, the highest in India
• 32 districts have more than 1 lakh farmers but no PCs
• 79% of PCs are aged 3 years or less 
7374
producer companies 
registered
4.3 million
members estimated
582
average number of 
shareholders per PC
2.6
producer companies 
per 1 lakh farmers
92%
farm-based
3%
with only women 
members
All data as of March 31, 2019; PC = producer company; PUC = paid-up capital; ‘active’ refers to PC registration status
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10
15
 FPC density (number of FPCs per 100,000 agricultural workers), for top 20 districts 
with highest number of agricultural workers per Census 2011
Notes: 
1. District location is per Census 2011 for comparison purposes (newly created districts have been mapped to Census 2011 districts)
2. Districts are shown in descending order of agricultural workers per Census 2011
3. FPC refers to PCs clearly identified as Farmer Producer Companies (92% of all PCs); excludes PCs which are non-farm or with unclear 
sectoral activities (see Chapter on ‘Selected Categories of PCs’ for more details)
All data as of March 31, 2019; PC = producer company; PUC = paid-up capital; ‘active’ refers to PC registration status
Spike in new 
registrations 
in recent years 
coincides 
with central 
and state 
government 
schemes.
Some districts 
with high 
number of 
agricultural 
workers have 
very few PCs.
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5,00,000
10,00,000
15,00,000
20,00,000
Maharashtra Uttar
Pradesh
Tamil
Nadu
Madhya
Pradesh
Telangana India
PUC category                                       No. of ‘active’ PCs                % of total   
PUC ≥ 50 lakh                                                                  90                        1.3%
PUC ≥ 25 and <50 lakh                                                  87                        1.3%
PUC ≥10 and <25 lakh                                                767                      11.1%
PUC < 10 lakh                                                             5982                      86.4% 
Of which:  
PUC ≥ 5 and < 10 lakh                                             1465                      21.2%
PUC > 1 and < 5 lakh                                             1146                      16.5%
PUC = 1 lakh                                                            2680                       38.7%
 PUC < 1 lakh                                                               691                      10.0%
All categories                                                6926                     100.0%
Only companies with active status
Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding
Distribution of producer companies by paid-up capital (PUC) Only 14% of PCs 
have paid-up 
capital of ₹10 
Lakh or more.
49% of PCs have 
paid-up capital 
of ₹1 lakh or 
less.
₹844 crore
Total paid-up capital across 
all 'active' PCs
₹1.1 lakh
Median paid-up capital of 
‘active’ PCs
Distribution of PUC of PCs in top 5 states and all India  (for active PCs only)
Note: The box extends from 25th to 75th percentile, while the ‘whiskers’ indicate extent of the 5th and 95th percentile.  Line with an ‘x’ 
indicates median. 95th percentile for Tamil Nadu is at 20.5 lakh.
PUC does not 
follow a ‘normal’ 
distribution and 
varies from state 
to state.
All data as of March 31, 2019; PC = producer company; PUC = paid-up capital; ‘active’ refers to PC registration status
13
Active PCs with paid-up 
capital ≥ ₹10 lakh as 
percentage of all PCs in 
each state/ UT
20%+10-19%<10%
Note: The map is based on Census 2001 district boundaries. Data for districts created 
after Census 2001 have been combined with previous district boundaries.
State                              PUC                  PUC 
                               ≥ Rs. 10L    < Rs. 10              Total
Karnataka                      134           225                359   37%
Kerala                         72           133                205    35%
Tamil Nadu     154           333                487    32%
West Bengal       48            203                251    19%
Uttar Pradesh     111           579                690    16%
Haryana                         47           251               298    16%
Madhya Pradesh      45           368                413    11%
Bihar                         25           263               288      9%
Maharashtra    154         1723            1877      8%
Andhra Pradesh      17           207                224      8%
Rajasthan                         21           307               328      6%
Telangana       17           383               400      4%
Orissa                         12           332              344      3%
All India                       944         5982            6926    14%
Active producer companies          
For states with more than 200 active PCs
₹213 crore
highest PUC in an active 
PC (age 13 years)
₹55 crore
Second highest PUC 
(age 8 years)
₹0
Lowest paid-up capital 
in 9 active PCs (ages 3 – 
13 years)
20 PCs
contribute >50% of 
combined PUC of all 
companies
Of the top 20 PCs, 10 
are dairies and 8 are 
plantations
All data as of March 31, 2019; PC = producer company; PUC = paid-up capital; ‘active’ refers to PC registration status
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Key challenges impeding the success of PCs
Different stakeholders have different normative 
imaginations of producer companies
Farmers: “Non-exploitative buyer”
Differences among promoters: “Farmers are 
beneficiaries of FPCs” Or “FPCs are businesses 
which must become viable” or “Local institution for 
empowerment”
1
This affects the importance they give to the following aspects
Producers lack individual and collective 
sense of ownership
Low transaction frequency leads to low 
member loyalty and ownership
Most members could not distinguish 
between the NGO and producer company
“This is a govt. dairy”
“Our money is safe with the NGO”
2 FPCs lack business acumen and 
expertise
Focus on single commodity is problematic
“Biggest problem is that producer 
companies are not run by entrepreneurs”
“Because PC boards do not understand 
business risks, they are unable to make 
informed choices”
3
Most producer companies are severely 
undercapitalised
Spending ₹30L (per PC promotion cost) to 
create large number of undercapitalised 
PCs with PUC of ₹1 lakh or less 
49% of active PCs have PUC of ₹1 lakh or 
less, cannot start significant trading or 
value-addition
Limits ability to raise loans
4 Companies cannot succeed in isolation; 
they need a supporting ecosystem
“Govt. officials did not know what an FPC 
is, and whether we are eligible for certain 
schemes”
“We stopped MSP procurement because we 
were required to pay farmers within 72 hrs”
Absence of local business service providers, 
infrastructure
5
Internal governance is weak, usually 
linked to low sense of ownership and 
capabilities
Unclear decision-making processes, roles & 
responsibilities 
Board members not aware of key functional 
aspects (who is CEO, loans, turnover)
Conflicts of interest with CEOs holding 
positions in multiple orgs, exposing 
shareholders to risks
6 Compliance requirements are onerous
“Requirements are the same for us as for 
large companies”
“I could not sleep the first time I did RTGS 
transfer thinking money could go to wrong 
account”
Company & director verification (live-video, 
geo-tagging) is difficult where internet is 
poor 
Cost of compliance: ₹50k – 2 lakh
7
Quotes are composite quotes and/or edited for brevity. All data as of March 31, 2019; PC = producer company; PUC = paid-up capital; ‘active’ refers to PC registration status
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We recommend the promotion of producer companies in a two-tier model (comprising 
multiple supplier PCs and a market-facing company) at a block or district level, collectively 
handling multiple-commodities, value-addition and marketing
Individual farmers own shares in their respective supplier PC as well as the market-facing PC
16
Summary of key recommendations based on this study
Category Recommendations
Locations
Model
Commodities
Value addition
Equity capital
• Promote more PCs in districts with larger numbers of small producers, especially in
   aspirational districts
• Multiple producer companies organised in a two-tier structure at the block or district level
• Supplier PCs: 500+ members, aggregation, grading and sorting
• Market-facing companies: assured buyer for supplier PCs’ produce, delayed marketing, 
   value-addition, marketing and sales
• Supplier PCs and individual farmers should own significant shares and have strong 
   representation on the board of market-facing companies to ensure  alignment with 
   producers' interests
• Market-facing companies should be invested in success of supplier PCs
• Multi-commodity (procure only commodities produced by members in significant volumes)
• Mostly by market-facing companies
• 2:1 equity match for PCs comprising more than 80% small farmers
• Disburse equity grants in 3-4 tranches to enable incremental growth
• Allow external investment through non-voting shares. Protect social objectives by imposing limits 
  on maximum amount of equity per external investor relative to total equity of farmers
Business 
acumen and 
expertise
Promoting and 
supporting PCs
Other 
regulatory
• Bring through market-facing companies, which can hire a competent team
• Market-facing companies are expected to hand-hold supplier PCs 
• Supplier PCs should be promoted by NGOs and other grass-roots organisations
• Market-facing companies should be supported by social enterprises and other organisations with 
  business experience
• Producer companies will require support from different kinds of resource institutions at different 
  points in their life-cycle
• Link PCs to government programs and schemes
• Develop a business ecosystem in blocks and districts to provide various business services to PCs
• Create a distinct marker in registration number for producer companies so that they can be 
   tracked and regulated differently
• Simplify compliance filings and allow submission in paper form
• Clarify eligibility for schemes available for cooperatives and individual farmers
• Offer protection for shareholders, similar to SEBI’s provisions for shareholder protection in 
   publicly traded companies
PC = Producer Company
17
1. Introduction
Eighty-seven percent of agricultural households in India are small and marginal 
producers, cultivating small plots which generate low returns. Their average 
monthly income is Rs 6426, making farming on small plots economically unviable 
(NSSO 2014). Therefore, policy makers and practitioners are turning to producer 
collectives as a means for improving the economic situation of small producers. 
Such collectivisation is expected to reduce transaction costs and bring scale 
advantages through bulk purchase of inputs, exchange of knowledge and 
information among members, cost efficiencies in value-addition and marketing, 
better price realisation through aggregation and value addition, and risk reduction 
(Kanitkar 2016, NABARD 2019, S. Singh 2008). Collectivisation is also expected 
to protect farmers within modern competitive markets by strengthening their 
collective bargaining power relative to large buyers and companies with significant 
private capital (Tandon 2019, Trebbin and Hassler 2012). Policy makers and 
practitioners also expect producer collectivisation to contribute to larger goals of 
social and economic empowerment of marginalized groups.
Many different organisational forms of collective 
enterprises have been promoted at different times 
in India. The oldest formal collectives were the 
credit cooperatives, which have been promoted 
since the early 1900s under the 1904 Cooperative 
Credit Societies Act, with the primary objective 
of addressing farmers’ indebtedness and poverty through "encouragement of 
individual thrift and mutual cooperation among the members, with a view to 
the utilization of their combined credit" (GOI 1904). Subsequently, formation of 
non-credit collectives was enabled through the Cooperative Societies Act of 1912, 
which allowed the formation of non-credit societies and federal cooperative 
organisations such as consumer cooperatives, marketing cooperatives, 
cooperatives of handlooms weavers and others. Later, in 1942, the Multi-Unit 
Cooperative Societies Act was enacted to allow cooperative societies to operate in 
more than one state (GOI 2009). This Act paved the way for more comprehensive 
cooperative acts such as the Multi-State Cooperative Societies Acts of 1984 and 
2002, the Model Cooperatives Act 1990, the Andhra Pradesh Mutually Aided 
Cooperative Societies (APMACS) Act of 1995 and others.
However in recent decades the functioning and financial performance of 
cooperatives has come under criticism because cooperatives have not been able 
to grow into strong member-controlled and self-sustainable business entities 
(Shah 2016). This failing has been attributed to low member commitment 
(Trebbin and Hassler 2012), excessive dependence on government funds, political 
interference, bureaucratisation and corruption (GOI 2000). 
1 This section draws partially from Neti, Govil and Rao (2019).
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In order to address these shortcomings, a ‘high-powered committee’ chaired by 
Dr. Y. K. Alagh introduced the concept of producer companies to bring together 
desirable aspects of cooperative and corporate sectors for the benefit of primary 
producers, especially small and marginal farmers (Alagh 2019, GOI 2000).  
Subsequently, in 2002, the Companies Act of 1956 was amended to allow for a 
new form of corporate entity, namely, Producer Companies (GOI 2011, GOI 2013). 
While membership in a cooperative is open to any 
individual or another cooperative, Central or State 
Government and other entities2 who may or may not 
be primary producers, shares in producer companies 
can only be owned by primary producers or their 
collectives (such as SHGs, producer cooperatives and other producer companies). 
In addition, PCs may require shareholders to transact with the company 
(“patronage”) as a condition for maintaining their membership. 
In cooperatives, the government has representation on the governing board and 
exercises control through veto power over the Board’s decisions. In contrast, in 
producer companies there is no provision for government representation on the 
Board of Directors (GOI 2013, Shah 2016, Trebbin and Hassler 2012, Singh and 
Singh 2014).
Due to these and other advantages of producer companies, they are seen as 
a better alternative than cooperatives. Many government programmes and 
schemes are now relying on Producer Companies (PCs) as vehicles for improving 
the economic situation of farmers and other producers such as weavers, artisans, 
and others3.  This is evident in a number of schemes, many of which have been 
announced as part of Union Budgets in recent years and administered through 
NABARD, Small Farmer Agri-business Consortium (SFAC) and various government 
departments. The social sector too appears to be viewing Producer Companies 
as an important part of their work on rural livelihoods, especially for improving 
market access and incomes of small producers. As a result, a large number 
of organisations are working on promoting, supporting, capacity building and 
funding of PCs across the country. 
PCs are engaged in a wide range of activities. Many FPCs are engaged in bulk 
procurement of inputs, while others are acting as intermediaries in the value-chain 
by aggregating produce from small and marginal farmers and doing some primary 
processing (such as grading and sorting). A few FPCs are engaged in higher 
forms of value-addition activities such as pulping or juicing of fruits, chopping 
and freezing of vegetables, etc. Some FPCs are producing ready-to-eat / cook 
2 Includes National Cooperative Development Corporation (NCDC), any corporation owned or 
controlled by the government, any government company, etc.
3 The term Producer Companies (PCs) refers to both farm and non-farm producer companies 
registered under producer company provisions of the Companies Act. The term Farmer Producer 
Companies (FPCs) refers to producer companies engaged in agriculture and allied activities. The 
term Farmer Producer Organizations (FPOs) is a broader term which includes Farmer Producer 
Companies (FPCs), farmer cooperatives and farmer societies.  
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products and non-food items such as vermi-compost, natural holi colours and 
mosquito-repellent cow dung cakes. FPCs are selling their produce in wholesale 
mandis, to large traders, restaurants and hotels, corporate bulk buyers or directly 
to consumers.  A few FPCs have obtained licence to become nodal agencies for 
procurement of agricultural commodities at minimum support prices (MSP). A 
few others have become licensed agencies of agricultural-input manufacturers, or 
crop insurance companies. Non-farm PCs are engaged in weaving, handicrafts and 
other activities.
Many studies have been undertaken to analyse the capabilities and performance 
of PCs. Previously published papers have highlighted challenges of selected PCs 
such as low capital base, insufficient external finance, talent gap, operational 
issues, weak governance, inadequate storage and processing facilities (Singh and 
Singh 2014, Kanitkar 2016, Prasad 2017, Shah 2016, Govil 2018, NABARD 2018a, 
Mahajan 2014, Sastry 2017). 
However, there continues to be a gap in understanding broad characteristics 
of PCs across India such as their total number, geographical distribution, their 
primary activities, number of shareholders, paid-up capital, etc.  Understanding 
these characteristics is essential both for policy-making and intervention design. 
But reliable data on all PCs in India is not available in a consolidated manner. 
There continues to be much confusion about the total number and other basic 
information about producer companies, even seventeen years after the Producer 
Companies Act 2002 came into effect.  Previous estimates of the number of 
producer companies in India range from 2000 to 6000 (NABARD 2018, SFAC 2018, 
Trebbin 2016, Shah 2016, S. Singh 2015, Srinivasan and Srinivasan 2018).  Many of 
these estimates are now out-of-date.  
In addition, there are also concerns about the ways in which PCs are being 
promoted and run, and the nature and extent of their impact. Most PCs are 
struggling to improve producers’ incomes and are incurring losses despite 
financial and operational support from government bodies, NGOs and other 
promoting agencies. Most of them have also been unable to strengthen marginal 
producers’ overall economic and social situation.
The above concerns led us to undertake a study of PCs in India with three 
objectives: (i) to analyse the characteristics of producer companies in India,  (ii) to 
investigate questions related to their strategic challenges, capitalisation, internal 
governance, regulation, and long-term potential, and, (iii) to recommend possible 
strategies to improve the viability of producer companies.
We constructed a comprehensive dataset on PCs using information available on 
the Ministry of Corporate Affairs' (MCA) website and made several updations 
and corrections to the dataset (described in the chapter on Methodology). 
Using statistical methods, we determined the reliability of this updated dataset 
to be high. 
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For understanding the strategic challenges, governance, and long-term potential 
of PCs, we undertook a qualitative study based on visits and in-depth interviews. 
We visited selected PCs covering a range of primary produce, locations and scale 
of operations. We held discussions with farmer-shareholders, board of directors, 
CEOs and management of 24 PCs across 8 states. 
In addition, we interviewed 22 government 
and non-government organisations engaged in 
promotion and support of producer companies. We 
also analysed various Acts and policy documents, 
government circulars, notifications and guidelines as 
well as annual reports and documents of producer companies and social sector 
organisations.  
This report presents a comprehensive view of the landscape of PCs in India.  The 
next chapter (Chapter 2) provides details of the research methodology. Chapter 
3 describes the efforts of government, NGO and other institutions to promote 
and support PCs. Chapter 4 presents an overview of the number of producer 
companies and their geographic spread. Chapter 5 examines operating models, 
capitalisation and financial viability of PCs. Chapter 6 describes characteristics 
of PCs engaged in dairy and non-farm activities and those of women-only PCs. 
Chapter 7 discusses questions related to ownership, internal governance and 
regulatory mechanisms as well as normative imagination of different stakeholders 
about the purpose of PCs. Chapter 8 concludes the report  with recommendations 
for possible strategies to improve the viability of producer companies and a 
discussion on the future prospects of producer companies in India. 
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2. Research Methodology
This study was carried out over a period of two years between January 2018 and 
December 2019. It comprised of three parts: a) a quantitative study of data on all 
producer companies registered in the country, b) a qualitative study based on over 
100 in-depth interviews conducted with producer-directors, producer-members, 
promoting institutions, government agencies, and other stakeholders, and, c) a 
close examination of Acts, policies, circulars and notifications and documents of 
producer companies and social sector organisations.  
2.1 Analysis of Quantitative Data1 
The producer company amendment to the Companies Act was notified on Jan 1, 
2003. Therefore, we collected data on all producer companies registered between 
Jan 1, 2003 and March 31, 2019 from the Ministry of Corporate Affairs’ (MCA) 
website. We selected companies with the words ‘producer company’ or ‘producers 
company’ in their name, as the Companies Act requires producer companies to 
have the words “Producer Company Limited” in their name.  
First, we corrected misspellings, duplicate entries, mismatching and missing 
data fields. We filled-in missing information manually using publicly available 
information on company registration and filings.  Second, several companies 
had business activity codes which did not seem to be related to primary 
production (e.g. ‘business services’) and companies with names that indicated 
unusual business activities (e.g. a thermal power producer company). For such 
companies, we retained only those which were registered as producer companies 
under Section 581 of Part IX A of the Companies Act 1956 or Section 465 of the 
Companies Act 2013, by checking purchased Articles of Association and other 
documents. 
Third, we added several companies which were present in lists of producer 
companies published by SFAC, NABARD and other central and state government 
agencies, but were missing in the MCA spreadsheets.
Fourth, in many cases, the addresses were incomplete or had changed since 
registration.  We checked the addresses of all companies in the dataset and 
corrected district names. In cases where district names have been changed or new 
districts have been formed (for example, in Telangana, UP, and other states), this 
information was updated. In addition, for comparison with other national datasets 
(such as the number of agricultural workers in a district), we mapped producer 
company addresses to Census 2011 district names used in national datasets.  
Fifth, Authorized Capital and Paid-up Capital data shown in MCA spreadsheets was 
out-of-date in many cases.  We manually updated these fields to reflect the correct 
values shown on MCA website as of April 2019.  
1 This section is a largely taken from Neti, Govil and Rao (2019).
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Finally, registered companies may be ‘struck-off’ under Section 248 of Companies 
Act 2013 for failure to commence or maintain business activities within stipulated 
time.  We updated our dataset to reflect the latest status of each company as of 
April 2019. 
After all these corrections and updations, we created a comprehensive list of 7374 
producer companies registered between Jan 1, 2003 and Mar 31, 2019.  This is the 
dataset used for all quantitative analysis presented in this report. 
Accuracy Estimation and Limitations of the Dataset
Our methodology identified 7374 producer companies registered until March 31, 
2019, a number which is double than that in most of the previously published 
estimates.  Despite the verifications and corrections, it was conceivable that some 
companies with the words ‘producer company’ in their name are not producer 
companies incorporated under Section 581 of Part IX-A of Companies Act 1956 
or Section 465 of Companies Act 2013.  Therefore, we wanted to negate the 
possibility that a large proportion of companies in our dataset had been included 
erroneously. 
However, it is not feasible to check each and every company individually and even 
if one were attempt to do so, it may not always be possible to determine whether 
they are indeed producer companies. Therefore, we decided to estimate the 
accuracy of the dataset by taking a sampling approach combined with a t-test.  We 
selected a random sample of 100 companies from our dataset and verified these 
companies’ registration based on lists published by NABARD, SFAC, promoter 
organizations and through company websites; where required, we purchased 
company incorporation documents.  
Among this random sample of 100 companies, 99 were registered as producer 
companies under relevant sections of the Companies Act, corresponding to a 
sample mean of 0.99.  If we were to apply the sample mean to the full population, 
we can expect 99% of companies in the dataset to be registered as producer 
companies; in other words, approximately 74 companies (1% of total) may not be 
registered as producer companies. 
T-distribution statistics show that the probability of the full population mean being 
within ±3% of the sample mean, is 99.81%.  Next, we tested another random 
sample to re-validate the reliability of this estimate: The appropriate sample size 
for a data set of 7374 companies with a sample proportion of 0.99 is 43 (using 
central limit theorem with error of ±3% and a confidence level of 95%). For this 
new random sample, we found that 100% of the 43 companies were registered 
as producer companies.  These collection of tests revealed that our dataset has a 
high level of reliability.  
We did a similar accuracy check for district data: We checked registered addresses 
of 50 randomly selected companies and found that all 50 district locations were 
correct. Thus, the district information in the dataset also has a very high level of 
reliability.  
25
A second possible source of error in the dataset is that of exclusion:  If a producer 
company does not have the words ‘producer company’ (or its variants) in its 
name, it would not appear in our dataset.  We have tried to correct for these gaps 
by integrating lists from multiple sources such as NABARD, SFAC and others.  
However, there is a possibility that our dataset may still be incomplete.
Third, our dataset contains several companies registered as producer companies 
under the relevant sections of the Companies Act, but engaged only in activities 
which are not intended as the primary activities of producer companies (such 
as those engaged exclusively in providing credit facilities) . There may also be 
companies where the shareholders are not ‘primary producers’ as defined in the 
Act. Our dataset does not correct for this as these companies are registered with 
the Ministry of Corporate Affairs as producer companies under the relevant Acts.
To summarize, the quantitative analysis presented in this report is based on a 
dataset of 7374 producer companies (registered between Jan 1, 2003 and March 
31, 2019) identified on the basis of publicly available data from the Ministry of 
Corporate affairs and corrected for various types of inclusion/ exclusion errors, 
and updated as of April 2019.  Statistical tests indicate that the accuracy level of 
this dataset is very high.  
2.2 Interviews with Stakeholders
We conducted over 100 in-depth interviews of stakeholders involved in PCs, to 
understand questions related to their strategic challenges, governance, and long-
term potential.  Table 2.1 provides a summary of all interviews conducted.  
Table 2.1 Summary of in-depth interviews conducted 
* Interviews conducted jointly with multiple respondents in one meeting have been counted once.  
** 4 producer companies in the sample were also acting as promoters or resource institutions for other PCs
2  While such activities appear to be technically allowed by the Act, PCs offering financial services 
as standalone activities with unclear criteria for membership and shareholding may be going 
against the spirit of the Act.
2
Category of respondents           No of unique organisations      No. of interviews*
Producer companies           24, of which :                                         64, of which :
(members, management)                      • 22 conducted in-person                    • 62 conducted in-person                          
                                                                   • 4 also promote other PCs**             • 4 also promote other PCs**
                                                                    • 1 in process of converting                 • 7 groups in process of
                                                                        from coop to PC                            joining/ registering PC
Promoting and resource                       18 (plus, additional 4 PCs**)                25 (plus, additional 4 PCs**) 
institutions       
Funders and investors                            7                                                           13
(govt. and non-govt.)           
Other stakeholders                                4                                                             4
(traders, processing units)
Total                                                 53                                                            106                     
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As part of the study, we also conducted in-depth interviews with promoting 
and resource institutions such as NGOs, government institutions, and others 
(Table 2.2). Some of the institutions have promoted a handful of PCs, many 
have promoted 15-25, and several have promoted/supported over 100 PCs.  In 
addition, we held detailed discussions with government institutions such as SFAC 
and NABARD and other stakeholders involved in incubating and supporting PCs.  
These discussions were aimed at understanding the different approaches used 
for establishing and supporting producer companies, and the future potential of 
producer companies.
Table 2.2  Categories of promoting and resource institutions interviewed for 
the study
In addition, we analysed Acts and government policy documents at centre and 
state levels, various circulars, notifications and guidelines relating to government 
schemes and programs to understand their reach and scope.  We also reviewed 
Annual Reports of many promoter organisations, funding agencies and individual 
PCs, to get a more nuanced understanding of the intent and status of their efforts. 
2.3 Interviews with Producer Companies
For producer company interviews, we selected PCs based on the type of 
institution which mobilized farmers, the type of produce, location, age and scale of 
operations. We interviewed 24 PCs and held detailed discussions with producer-
shareholders, board of directors, CEOs and company management (Table 2.1).  
Some of these interviews were held individually, while others were held in small 
groups.  The age of PCs varied from 0 – 11 years and their turnover ranged from a 
few lakh to a few hundred crore rupees.  
The purpose of these visits and interviews was to understand the perspectives 
of producer-members and company management/ directors in terms of internal 
governance mechanisms and business potential, and their ideas regarding the 
purpose and future of their company.
* Interviews conducted jointly with multiple respondents have been counted once. 
Category of promoting and resource institutions            No. of unique organisations       No. of interviews*
NGOs and social sector orgs.                                                                                         13               19
Government  institutions                                                                                            3                             5
Social enterprises                                                                                                              2                 4
Other PCs                                                                                                                                4                  4
Total                                                                                                                              22               32
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Category State Primary 
produce
Value-added 
products
Other significant 
services
Year 
Registered
Promoted 
by NGO / 
Social sector 
organisations
Uttar 
Pradesh
Madhya 
Pradesh
Madhya 
Pradesh
Madhya 
Pradesh
Madhya 
Pradesh
Odisha
Odisha
Odisha
Karnataka
Tamil 
Nadu
Tamil 
Nadu
Tamil 
Nadu
Wheat, rice, menthol, 
amaranth seeds
- Procurement at MSP 
(now stopped)
2014
Aromatic rice, 
flaxseed, pulses
Ready-to-eat 
snacks
Extension services, 
inclusion of local traders 
in PC operations, sales to 
social enterprise
2012
Custard apples, 
organic cotton
Frozen custard apple 
pulp, jamun pulp
Employment for producers 
at processing unit
2015
Aromatic rice, 
millets
Ready-to-eat snacks Extension services, 
inclusion of local traders 
in PC operations, sales to 
social enterprise
2015
Aromatic rice, 
millets, flaxseed
2015Extension services, 
inclusion of local traders 
in PC operations, sales to 
social enterprises
Ready-to-eat snacks 
2014Poultry - -
Plan to start mixed 
model with fish, poultry 
and cultivation
2019- -
Aromatic rice, 
vegetables
2019- -
Organic cotton, chia, 
pulses, vegetables, 
millets, marigold
Ginning Enabling third-party 
organic certification
2010
Paddy, pulses, 
groundnut, seed 
production on contract
2010Crop insurance, household 
provisions
-
Paddy, black gram Crop insurance
Crop loans
2015-
Mangoes, tomatoes, 
groundnut, coconut, 
other fruits & 
vegetables
Mango pulp 
processing plant 
under construction
2017-
Govt. institution 
promoted*
Rajasthan
Rajasthan
Odisha
Milk Pasteurized milk, 
milk products
Extension services, 
facilitate livestock 
insurance, sales to 
Mother Dairy
2012
Milk 2016Extension services-
Groundnuts, cotton - - 2016
Table 2.3 Key characteristics of producer companies interviewed  
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Category State Primary 
produce
Value-added 
products
Other significant 
services
Year 
Registered
Self-promoted Maharashtra
Maharashtra
Maharashtra
Maharashtra
(Value-addition) Grading, sorting of grapes 
for export; tomato puree, 
jams, juices and fresh 
produce for local retail
Extension services, GAP 
certification for supplier PCs, 
Accounting and regulatory 
compliance for supplier PCs
2010
Pulses and onions Storage for delayed sale, 
MSP procurement 
(now stopped)
2014-
Grapes 2016- -
Tomatoes 2016- -
Karnataka Sugarcane, rice, 
millets, fruits & 
vegetables, milk
Jaggery, millet flour Organic certification 
for members
In process 
of being 
converted 
to PC
Federation Madhya 
Pradesh
Maharashtra
-
(Federation)
- Advocacy, enabling 
linkage with govt. 
schemes, branding & 
marketing support
2014
-
(Federation)
2014Advocacy, enabling 
linkage with govt. 
schemes for member PCs
Non-farm Karnataka - 
(Non-farm)
Garments 2013-
* This category refers to companies promoted directly by government institutions such as agriculture universities, NDDB Dairy Services and others.  Many other 
companies in this table have received financial support from government institutions.
Note: Most companies are also engaged in bulk procurement of inputs for their members
Tamil 
Nadu
Paddy Food products Marketing of food prod-
ucts from ‘sister’ FPOs, 
Petrol bunk
2008
Kerala Coconut 2015Coconut oil, neera -
Govt. institution 
promoted*
(Continued)
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3. Promotion and Support of PCs 
As mentioned earlier, a total of 7374 producer companies have been registered 
as of March 31, 2019. This has been made possible through the efforts of many 
government organisations, NGOs, foundations, corporate CSR organisations, social 
enterprises and individuals. At least half of the producer companies have been 
promoted under various government schemes. Many have also benefited from 
mobilisation, capacity building, market linkages and funding support from NGOs, 
foundations and other social sector organisations. 
Almost from the beginning, the government has played a critical role in promotion 
and support of producer companies. Some of the oldest producer companies 
were formed under the District Poverty Initiative Program (DPIP) in Madhya 
Pradesh by bringing together existing Common Interest Groups of farmers. As 
early as FY07, the Government of Madhya Pradesh funded 17 producer companies 
under its District Poverty Initiatives Project1. As part of the program, each PC 
received a grant of Rs. 25 lakh as working capital and Rs 24.5 lakh to cover 
administration costs for a period of 5 years. Some of the DPIP PCs were given 
additional grants under other schemes for constructing warehouses or were given 
support in the form of office space, vehicles, etc. (Singh and Singh 2014). 
Currently, some schemes offer financial support through equity grants, paying 
for CEO salaries and administrative costs, providing interest-free (or low interest) 
loans, or facilitating bank credit through credit guarantee schemes. Loans up 
to Rs. 2 crore for FPOs (including loans up to Rs 50 lakh for warehouse systems 
receipts) are covered under priority sector lending (RBI 2015)2. Many schemes 
and programmes provide funding to promoting/ resource organisations for 
community mobilisation and registration of companies. 
In addition, there are other types of support received by producer companies such 
as awareness building programs, training of CEOs and board members, training of 
empanelled promoting/ resource institutions and provisions for extending various 
government programs such as procurement at Minimum Support Prices to FPCs, 
or ongoing operational and technical support (e.g. by NDDB Dairy Services or 
Krishi Vikas Kendras).  
Furthermore, Union Budget 2018-19 announced a 5-year tax holiday for FPOs 
with turnover of up to Rs. 100 crores. And, Union Budget 2019-20 announced 
the government’s intention to form 10,000 new FPOs over the next 5 years. In 
fact, according to NABARD, “All major centrally sponsored schemes of DAC&FW 
(Dept. of Agriculture Cooperation & Farmers Welfare) have special provisions for 
promotion and nurturing of FPOs” (NABARD 2018).
1 As of April 2019, 5 out of these 17 FPCs have been struck off or are in the process of being 
struck off.
2 RBI’s ‘Report of the Internal Working Group to Review Agricultural Credit’, dated 13 Sep 2019 
recommends bank loans of Rs. 5 crore for FPCs with at least 75% small and marginal farmers and 
assured marketing of their produce at pre-determined price.
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3.1 Conversion of Cooperatives to PCs
The Producer Companies Act 2002 provides for conversion of existing inter-state 
cooperatives into producer companies. In fact, the largest producer company by 
paid-up-capital, Sri Vijaya Visakha Milk Producer Company, was a dairy cooperative 
which converted into a producer company in January 2006. Many others such as 
Karimnagar Milk Producer Company, Sangam Milk producer company, Madhya 
Pradesh Women Poultry Producers Company have also done the same. Several 
other cooperatives (especially dairy cooperatives) have already registered 
themselves as producer companies or are in the process of doing so.
3.2 Support by SFAC
In 2011, the Government of India designated SFAC as the nodal agency for 
facilitating the promotion of FPOs under two sub-schemes of the Rashtriya 
Krishi Vikas Yojna namely, National Vegetable Initiative for Urban Clusters and 
Integrated Development of 60,000 Pulse Villages in Rainfed Areas. The focus of 
these two schemes was to enhance overall productivity of vegetables and pulses, 
and provide market linkage to small producers through the formation of FPOs 
(SFAC 2013). Since then, SFAC has also been mandated to promote FPOs under 
other programmes such as National Food Security Mission, Mission for Integrated 
Development of Horticulture, Coconut Development Board, etc. (SFAC 2018, 
Ministry of Agriculture 2014).  
Union Budget for 2013-14 announced Rs. 100 crore for establishing a Credit 
Guarantee Fund for FPOs and another Rs. 50 crore towards Equity Grant scheme 
for FPCs, to be channelled through SFAC. Currently, under SFAC’s Equity Grant 
Scheme, FPCs with a minimum of 50 farmers and paid-up capital of less than 30 
lakh can get a matching equity grant of up to Rs 15 lakh in two instalments (SFAC 
n.d.1). As of April 2019, SFAC has supported 440 FPCs under the Equity Grant 
scheme of which 15 FPCs have received the second instalment too (Table 3.1). 
SFAC’s Credit Guarantee Scheme provides FPCs with a minimum of 500 farmer 
shareholders access to bank loans up to Rs 100 lakh with a credit guarantee cover 
of 85% of loan sanctioned under the scheme (NABARD 2018). As of April 2019, 51 
FPCs have been supported under this scheme.
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Table 3.1 Support provided by SFAC under Equity Grant and Credit Guarantee Scheme 
SFAC also provides other kinds of support to FPOs.  It designates FPOs as 
procurement agents under Price Stabilisation Fund for procurement at minimum 
support prices (NABARD 2018).  In addition, SFAC provides soft-loans 
to FPOs and other producer groups under its Venture Capital Assistance Scheme 
(SFAC 2018a). 
In order to promote and support PCs, SFAC has empanelled 90 resource institutions 
and provided them financial support for promotion of FPCs (Table 3.2).  Most of 
these resource institutions are NGOs and other organizations working in the social 
sector (SFAC n.d.2). In fact, under some schemes SFAC provides financial support 
only to institutions promoting FPOs but not directly to FPOs (SFAC n.d.1). 
In order to benefit larger number of small and marginal producers, the Union 
Budget 2019-20 announced a plan to promote 10,000 additional FPOs over the 
next 5 years with SFAC as the nodal agency. For this purpose, SFAC has prepared a 
Strategy Paper proposing an outlay of Rs. 6866 crore, of which Rs. 2500 crore has 
been designated as cost of formation and incubation and Rs. 1800 crore towards 
FPO management costs of 10,000 FPOs over 5 years. Rs. 2250 crore is budgeted 
for Equity Grant and Credit Guarantee schemes (SFAC n.d.3).
3.3 Support by NABARD
As of March 31, 2019, NABARD has promoted over 4000 FPOs under two schemes: 
Producer Organisation Development Fund (PODF) initiated in 2011-12 with a 
corpus of Rs. 50 crores and PRODUCE Fund of Rs. 200 crores established in 
2014-15 for promotion of 2000 FPOs over two years (NABARD 2018, NABARD 2019). 
In order to promote and support PCs, NABARD has empanelled 795 Producer 
Organisation Promoting Institutions (POPIs) for the purpose of promotion and 
capacity building of FPOs (Table 3.2). NGOs, banks, government departments, 
cooperative societies, associations or federations can become POPIs (NABARD 
2018). The roles and responsibilities of NABARD empanelled POPIs include cluster 
identification, diagnostic and feasibility studies, business planning, mobilisation of 
* Number of unique companies was 440.  15 companies availed a second instalment under the scheme.. 
Source:  SFAC Annual Reports (2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019). 
   Equity Grant Scheme                             Credit Guarantee Scheme
Year  No. of cases  Amount sanctioned (Rs. lakh)  No. of cases Amount sanctioned (Rs. lakh)
2014-15                    22       114.83    4      182.90
2015-16                    27       153.02    8      353.11
2016-17                    52       290.69    9      395.25
2017-18                                153                                 951.07    9      507.45
2018-19                  201         13.80                    21      628.04
TOTAL                 455*     1523.42                    51    2066.74
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producers, registration/incorporation of PO, resource mobilisation, development 
of management systems and procedures, business operations and assessment 
and audit (NABARD 2015). Some POPIs have promoted only a few PCs each while 
others have promoted 100 or more PCs.
Table 3.2 Number of organisations empanelled by NABARD and SFAC for 
promoting FPOs 
Small and marginal farmers constitute 82% of the total membership of NABARD 
promoted FPOs, and women constitute 32%. 724 FPOs have licences for direct 
input dealership, 1298 are market-linked and 3249 are credit-linked (NABARD 
2019).  As it has promoted a large number of FPOs, NABARD has digitized data 
for monitoring progress of FPO promotion and made some of this data available 
publicly.  It has also created a ‘performance monitoring tool’ for assessing and 
monitoring overall performance of each FPO (Field interviews 2019).
NABKISAN Finance Ltd., a subsidiary of NABARD, provides financial support to 
FPOs in the form of collateral-based and collateral-free term loans and working 
capital loans to suit various lifecycle needs of the FPOs (NABKISAN n.d.). This 
financial support is covered by the Credit Guarantee Scheme of NABARD (NABARD 
2018, Field interviews 2019). NABKISAN also provides bulk loans to promoting 
institutions for on-lending to producer organisations. As of April 2019, NABKISAN 
has supported 275 PCs directly and another 225 PCs using the on-lending model. 
It also provides financial support at concessional rates to FPOs with mostly tribal 
members (NABKISAN 2019). 
3.4 Support by Others
Most schemes for supporting agriculture now include special provisions for 
promotion and nurturing of FPOs (NABARD 2018). For example, Mission for 
Integrated Development of Horticulture implements various schemes for 
promoting and strengthening FPOs such as National Horticulture Mission, 
Horticulture Mission for North East & Himalayan States and other schemes 
implemented through National Horticulture Board and Coconut Development 
Board (Ministry of Agriculture 2014). 
                       NABARD                            SFAC 
                   No. of Producer Organisation    
Year              Promoting Institutions                          No. of Resource Institutions
FY13             Not available               57 
FY14             Not available               61
FY15             Not available               63 
FY16            785                64 
FY17            795               65 
FY18            790               90
Source: NABARD and SFAC Annual Reports and websites
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Maharashtra Agricultural Competitiveness Project (MACP) has supported 364 
FPCs as of March 2018 (MACP 2018). Similarly other states are supporting FPOs 
under various departments and schemes, such as Odisha Rural Development 
and Marketing Society (ORMAS) and Rajasthan Agricultural Competiveness 
Project (RACP). And, under the National Dairy Plan I from FY12 to FY19, NDDB 
offered grants and loans to milk producer companies and other dairies for buying 
equipment, training, etc. (NDDB n.d.).  Various central and state government 
organisations have also empanelled resource institutions for promotion and 
support of PCs.  Some producer companies have been supported by international 
organisations such as DFID.
In addition, many producer companies have been promoted and funded by 
philanthropies such as Tata Trusts, Rabo Bank Foundation, Axis Bank Foundation, 
Dell Foundation, Reliance Foundation, etc. Many others have been funded 
by Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) arms of companies such as Mahyco 
Monsanto, Dupont, HSBC, Walmart, and others. 
3.5 Self-promoted PCs 
 
Some PCs have been promoted by large farmers who are better educated, well 
connected and able to invest significant capital.  For example, the second largest 
producer company in India (by paid-up capital), Sahyadri Farmers Producer 
Company, was initially promoted by a small group of grape producers in Nasik 
district. Today, the company exports grapes to multiple European countries and 
has set-up facilities for juicing, pulping and packaging of fruits and vegetables. 
It has a total turnover of over Rs. 300 crore and paid-up capital of Rs. 55 crore 
(Sahyadri FPCL 2018). It is also one of the largest exporters of grapes in the 
country today. It has also promoted more than ten other commodity-specific 
producer companies and procures fruits and vegetables from them.
Another such producer company we came across had 45 shareholders and 
Rs 37 lakh paid-up capital. They had set-up a processing facility for producing 
value-added millet products such as millet flakes, millet idli and dosa mix, etc. for 
domestic and export markets. We also met large onion farmers in Maharashtra 
who had registered a PC and had obtained a licence to procure onions under the 
Price Stabilisation Fund. 
3.6 Characteristics of NABARD and SFAC Supported Companies
NABARD and SFAC have promoted over 2000 PCs covering close to one and a 
half million farmers. Their efforts have energised the promotion of PCs by other 
stakeholders as well. To understand the characteristics of companies promoted 
by them, we identified such companies in our database. The data shows that 
the vast majority of companies supported by NABARD and SFAC (about 85%) 
were incorporated between 2 and 5 years ago.  This is not surprising as this time 
frame corresponds with introduction of various schemes by central and state 
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governments, as described earlier. PCs promoted by NABARD and SFAC are 
concentrated in 4 states: Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Tamil 
Nadu. These four states account for about 40% of the PCs supported by them.
In our database, we identified 1468 producer companies supported by NABARD 
with ‘active’ status. These companies have a total paid-up capital (PUC) of Rs. 
65.85 crore and a median PUC of Rs. 1.00 lakh (Table 3.3). For SFAC supported 
companies with active status, the total PUC is Rs 42.60 crore and median PUC is 
Rs. 3.50 lakh. The difference between average and median is significant because 
the PUC distribution among PCs is not a ‘normal distribution’ and includes very 
large PCs as well as many very small PCs (e.g. the top 20 companies contribute Rs. 
500 crore out of the total of Rs. 844 crore PUC of all active companies combined; 
see Chapter 5 for more details).  Therefore, median is a better measure than 
average for analysing PUC.  
Table 3.3 Aggregate characteristics of PCs supported by NABARD and SFAC (active 
status only)
Table 3.3 highlights that the PUC of SFAC supported companies is much greater 
than that of NABARD promoted companies and all PCs.  One possible explanation 
for this significant difference could be that the PUC figure for SFAC supported 
companies includes the amount of matching grants.  Another reason could be 
that to qualify for certain schemes, producer companies must meet minimum 
requirements.  For example, to be eligible for SFAC’s credit guarantee schemes, 
a PC is required to have a minimum of 500 shareholders, which may contribute 
to the greater PUC per company of SFAC supported companies. Further, under 
its equity matching grant scheme, SFAC matches member contribution up to Rs 
1000, which encourages resource institutions to promote PCs with slightly higher 
individual share capital. 
It would have been interesting to also compare the median PUC per shareholder 
across NABARD, SFAC and all PCs.  However, it is not possible to calculate the 
median as shareholder data is not available for each company.
Year           NABARD PCs                 SFAC PCs                All PCs 
Total number of producer companies*                1,468               756       6,926 
Ave. number of shareholders per company (est.)                  369              997          582** 
Total number of shareholders (est.)           5.4 lakh       7.5 lakh    40 lakh  
           
Total paid-up capital (PUC)                 Rs. 65.85 crore       Rs. 42.60 crore     Rs. 843.96 crore 
Ave. PUC per producer company   Rs. 4.49 lakh           Rs. 5.64 lakh        Rs.  12.19 lakh 
Median PUC per producer company   Rs. 1.00 lakh           Rs. 3.50 lakh           Rs. 1.10 lakh 
* From dataset prepared for this study; ‘active’ refers to registration status with MCA
** Estimate based on weighted average of NABARD and SFAC producer companies
Note: Three active companies were identified as having been supported both by SFAC and NABARD. They are included 
under both columns for the purpose of calculation 
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To summarize, the per PC capital contribution in SFAC companies tends to be 
much higher than for other PCs, which is consistent with its funding eligibility 
requirements. Furthermore, some of the differences between NABARD and SFAC 
supported PCs is perhaps indicative of the different requirements under their 
schemes.  
Both NABARD and SFAC have supported a large number of producer companies, 
either directly or through resources institutions empanelled by them. NABARD 
and SFAC promote support companies among marginalized groups with limited 
means and lower capacity to contribute share capital.  For example, for producer 
companies to qualify for SFAC’s equity grant and credit guarantee schemes, a 
minimum of 33% of their shareholders must be small, marginal and landless 
tenant farmers (as defined by the Ministry of Agriculture), and, the maximum 
shareholding by any one member other than an institutional member cannot be 
more than 5% of the total equity. 
3.7 Summary
7374 producer companies have been promoted in India by various central and 
state governments, philanthropies, CSR and farmers themselves. The Ministry 
of Agriculture estimates the average cost of promotion of each FPO to be 
approximately Rs. 30 lakh (Ministry of Agriculture 2013), which implies that about 
Rs. 2000 crores may have been spent in promoting and supporting these producer 
companies across the country over the last 17 years. Further investments are 
proposed with the increasing thrust on promotion of more producer companies 
both by central and state governments. This is in addition to the hundreds of 
crores invested by farmers themselves as shareholder equity (see Chapter 5). 
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4. Overview of PCs in India: 
Numbers, Locations, Shareholders
This chapter presents an overview of producer companies in India, their 
geographic spread and registration status. The chapter highlights significant 
regional disparity in promotion of new producer companies, across states and 
districts1. We compare the density of farmer producer companies relative to the 
total number of agricultural workers in districts. We also provide an estimate on 
the number of farmer-shareholders across all producer companies in India.
4.1 Total Number of PCs Registered by Year
As mentioned earlier, the producer company amendment to the Companies Act 
was approved by the President of India on Dec 31, 2002, and came into effect in 
January 2003. Therefore, we collected data on all producer companies registered 
between Jan 1, 2003 and March 31, 2019.  
No producer companies were registered in the first few months of the calendar 
year 2003 immediately after the notification of the Act. The very first company 
registered as a producer company in India was ‘Farmers Honey Bee India Producer 
Company Ltd.’, which was registered on June 6, 2003 in Chandigarh. Another four 
companies were subsequently registered in FY04 (i.e. between Apr 1, 2003 and 
Mar 31, 2004), bringing the total of producer companies to 5 in the first financial 
year after notification of the amendment (Table 4.1).  
Table 4.1 Number of producer companies registered
1 This section is a largely taken from Neti, Govil and Rao (2019). 
Financial Year              PCs registered            % of PCs
FY04         5  <1%
FY05      16  <1%
FY06      24  <1%
FY07      32  <1%
FY08      18  <1%
FY09      41  <1%
FY10      28  <1%
FY11      52    1%
FY12      78     1%
FY13    151     2%
FY14    497     7%
FY15    551     7%
FY16                   1691   23%
FY17                                     1477   20%
FY18                     909   12%
FY19                   1804   24%
Total                                    7374                  100%
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In the first ten years after notification of the act (i.e. FY04 through FY13), a total 
of only 445 companies were registered. In fact, the number of PCs incorporated 
exceeded 100 only in the 10th year (FY13). The pace of registration accelerated 
during FY14, when 497 PCs were registered, a number which exceeded all the 
previous 10 years combined. The number of companies registered crossed 1000 
for the first time in FY16.  In the most recent three financial years (FY17, FY18, 
FY19), 4190 PCs were registered, amounting to an average of almost 4 companies 
per day (Figure 4.1) with one of the four being registered in Maharashtra. 
Figure 4.1 Number of producer companies registered
This massive jump in registrations in recent years coincides with various state and 
central government schemes for promotion and support of FPOs in general, and 
FPCs in particular, which took effect in FY13, FY4 and FY15. 
In the dataset, we were able to identify roughly half the producer companies 
incorporated during or before FY18, as having received support from SFAC, 
NABARD and other central and state government schemes.  In many cases, we 
identified government supported companies through information published by 
various resource institutions. This is likely to be an underestimate as only a few 
organisations such as SFAC, NABARD and MACP publish a comprehensive list of 
supported FPCs. 
Financial support for PCs through government programs started picking up 
in FY13, which coincided with the uptick in FPC registrations.  There was an 
observable drop in PC registrations in FY18 which appears to correspond with the 
completion of NABARD’s PRODUCE programme. 
The relationship between producer company registrations and government 
schemes is also evident in the number of registrations which happen in the 
last quarter of each financial year: In the last 5 financial years (FY15 to FY19), a 
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disproportionate number of PCs (34%) have been registered during the months 
January to March of that financial year, indicating a possible rush to register 
companies to meet programmatic milestones. A more detailed discussion on 
characteristics of NABARD and SFAC supported PCs is provided in a later section in 
this report.
4.2 State-wise Distribution of Producer Companies 
Producer companies have been registered in 33 out of 36 states and union 
territories in India.  Maharashtra has by far the largest number of producer 
companies (1940), which is more than the next three states combined.  Four 
states, namely, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Madhya Pradesh 
account for about half the producer companies registered until March 31, 2019 
(Table 4.2).   
Table 4.2 Number of producer companies registered, by state or UT
State/ UT       PCs registered            % of PCs
Maharashtra     1940  26%
Uttar Pradesh       750  10%
Tamil Nadu       528    7%
Madhya Pradesh      458    6%
Telangana       420    6%
Rajasthan        373    5%
Karnataka        367    5%
Odisha        363    5%
Bihar        303    4%
Haryana       300    4%
West Bengal      274    4%
Andhra Pradesh      238    3%
Kerala      215    3%
Gujarat      183    2%
Jharkhand       133    2%
Chhattisgarh      114    2%
Assam       112    2%
Delhi        57    1%
Punjab        56    1%
Uttarakhand       37    1%
Manipur        30  <1%
Himachal Pradesh       22  <1%
Others      101    1% 
Total   7374                 100%
* Shows only states or UTs with 20 or more PCs. 
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Figure 4.2 Age distribution by state, for top 10 states
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Madhya Pradesh, which has the fourth largest number of registered PCs, started 
promoting producer companies early on under the DPIP program as mentioned 
in the previous section.  In fact, Madhya Pradesh has the greatest percentage 
of companies which are 5 years or older among the top 10 states (Figure 4.2). 
UP, on the other hand, hardly has any PCs older than 10 years.  UP started later 
than other ‘top’ states in PC formation, but rapidly caught up, surpassing Madhya 
Pradesh and Tamil Nadu in FY14.  Telangana and Haryana have a large percentage 
(66% and 68% respectively) of very young companies. 
4.3 District-wise Distribution of Producer Companies
As mentioned earlier, we mapped all producer companies to 640 districts per 
Census of India 2011. The average number of PCs per district is 11.5 while the 
median is 7.  
These aggregate figures mask significant disparity across districts.  The top 20 
districts with the most number of PCs have a combined total of 1688 producer 
companies, constituting nearly one-fourth of all producer companies in the 
country (Table 4.3).  Not surprisingly, out of these top 20 districts, 16 are in 
Maharashtra.  At the other extreme, there are 68 districts with no producer 
companies at all; while a few of these are urban districts such as New Delhi, the 
majority are in rural areas.
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Table 4.3  Top 20 districts with the largest number of producer companies registered
State    District                Number of PCs 
Maharashtra   Pune                   185
Maharashtra   Ahmadnagar                  162 
Maharashtra   Nashik                   136 
Maharashtra   Latur                   133 
Maharashtra   Aurangabad                  119 
Maharashtra   Osmanabad                    88 
Maharashtra   Amravati                     81 
Maharashtra   Bid                     74 
Uttar Pradesh   Lucknow                     72 
Maharashtra   Buldana                     68 
Andhra Pradesh   Warangal                     64 
Maharashtra   Jalna                     63 
Maharashtra   Solapur                     62 
Andhra Pradesh   Mahbubnagar                    61 
Maharashtra   Jalgaon                     60 
Maharashtra   Sangli                     56 
Maharashtra   Yavatmal                     52 
Andhra Pradesh   Medak                     51 
Maharashtra   Nagpur                     51 
Maharashtra   Kolhapur                     50 
Total                    1688
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Figure 4.3 Number of PCs by district 
50+10-490-9
PCs Registered
Note: The map is based on Census 2001 district boundaries. Data for districts created after Census 2001 have been 
combined with previous district boundaries.
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The district with the largest number of PCs is Pune, with 185 producer companies, 
followed by Ahmednagar with 162 and Nashik with 136 PCs.  Figure 4.3 shows 
the distribution of producer companies across all districts in the country.  It can 
be seen that there is a greater concentration of producer companies in certain 
districts of western and southern India than most districts in northern and eastern 
India.
Similarly, significant disparity can be observed within states too. For example, 
within Maharashtra while Pune has 185 PCs, while the district of Gadchiroli has 
only 10 (Figure 4.4).  There is no district in Maharashtra (except Mumbai) with 
less than 10 producer companies. In UP, while Lucknow has 72 PCs, the next 
largest Kanpur Nagar has 36.  Forty-six out of 71 districts in UP have less than 10 
producer companies and three districts have none.  Tamil Nadu appears to have 
a more even distribution of companies across districts with the top two districts 
having 42 and 41 PCs (Coimbatore and Erode, respectively) and almost all districts 
(except for Tiruppur and Ariyalur) having at least 10 PCs.  However, across the 
country, there appears to be a significant variation in the number of PCs across 
districts, pointing towards the need for re-assessing the geographical focus of PC 
promotion efforts. 
 
Figure 4.4 (a)  Number of PCs in districts of top 3 states with largest number of PCs: 
Maharashtra
50+10-490-9
PCs Registered
Note: The map is based on Census 2001 district boundaries. Data for districts created after Census 2001 have been 
combined with previous district boundaries.
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Figure 4.4 (b)  Number of PCs in districts of top 3 states with largest number of PCs: 
Uttar Pradesh
50+10-490-9
PCs Registered
Figure 4.4 (c)  Number of PCs in districts of top 3 states with largest number of PCs: 
Tamil Nadu
50+10-490-9
PCs Registered
Note: The maps are based on Census 2001 district boundaries. Data for districts created after Census 2001 have been 
combined with previous district boundaries.
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4.4 Density of FPCs 
Next, we examined the density of FPCs against the number of agricultural 
workers per district. According to Census 2011, there are about 2630 lakh 
agricultural workers in the country, including both main and marginal workers.  
We categorized the producer companies in our dataset into farm and non-farm 
companies (refer to Chapter on ‘Selected Categories of PCs’ for more detail).  This 
allowed us to calculate the density of farmer producer companies (FPCs) per one 
lakh farmers in each district in India. 
The average number of FPCs per one lakh farmers is 2.6; that is, for every 100,000 
agricultural workers in India, there are 2.6 farmer producer companies. However, 
there is significant variation in the density of producer companies across districts.  
Districts such as Pune, Ahmednagar and Nashik have much higher FPC density 
than the median district. There are 32 districts where there are more than 
1,00,000 farmers but no farmer producer companies.  These include districts in 
Gujarat, where there are hundreds of producer cooperatives, and also districts in 
UP and Assam, where the cooperatives’ coverage is low.
Figure 4.5 shows the density of farmer producer companies for top 20 districts 
with the greatest number of agricultural workers.  Pune (MH), Bardhaman (WB) 
and Anantapur (AP), all have roughly 13 lakh farmer-producers each.  However, 
Pune has 176 FPCs, Anantapur 44 and Bardhaman only 3. 
2 About 7% of agricultural workers are landless (per NSSO 2014). However, many of them may be 
engaged in livestock and other allied activities. Therefore, we have calculated FPC density for all 
agricultural workers rather than limiting it to only cultivators on own land. 
2
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Notes: 
1. State and district location is per Census 2011 for comparison purposes (newly created districts have been mapped 
to Census 2011 districts)
2. Districts are shown in descending order of agricultural workers per Census 2011
3. FPC refers to PCs clearly identified as Farmer Producer Companies (92% of all PCs); excludes PCs which are non-farm 
or with unclear sectoral activities (see Chapter on ‘Selected Categories of PCs’ for more details)
Figure 4.5  FPC density (number of FPCs per 100,000 agricultural workers), for top 20 
districts with highest number of agricultural workers per Census 2011
4.5 Active and Struck-off Companies
The Ministry of Corporate Affairs ‘strikes-off’ companies for three reasons 
specified under the Companies Act 2013, Section 248:  a) failure to commence 
business operations within one year of incorporation, b) failure of original 
subscribers (shareholders) to fully pay committed subscription (share capital) 
within 180 days of registration, and, c) not carrying on any business or operation 
for a period of two immediately preceding financial years without submitting any 
application for obtaining the status of a dormant company under Section 455. In 
addition, the MCA can strike off producer companies for failure to maintain any of 
the mutual assistance principles specified under Section 581ZP. 
A total of 445 producer companies have been struck off by the MCA or are in 
the process of being struck off, corresponding to 6% of all producer companies 
registered.  And 3 companies have been designated as dormant so far. In fact, the 
very first producer company registered under the act, ‘Farmers Honey Bee India 
Producer Company Ltd.’, mentioned earlier, has been struck off. In total 6926 PCs 
currently have ‘active’ status.
While the ‘struck-off’ percentage may appear small, it is important to note that 
companies can be struck-off only after two years of failure to maintain operations 
and after giving companies time to respond to Ministry notifications. Therefore, in 
47
the early years of a PC, there is little scope for the MCA to strike it off. As expected, 
Table 4.4 shows only a small proportion of young companies have been struck 
off.  However, among the producer companies which are 10 years and older, more 
than 46% have been struck off.   
It is important to note here that struck-off percentage should not be read as 
“death rate”, as striking off by MCA will always underestimate the actual death 
rate due to the time lag in reviewing and striking off companies, and also because 
some companies may continue to fulfil compliance requirements despite not 
engaging in any business activities.  Therefore, at any given point in time, the 
actual “death rate” would be higher than the struck-off percentage.
Table 4.4  Total number and percentage of companies struck-off by age*
* For simplicity, struck-off columns includes companies struck-off, underprocessof being struck-off and dormant 
companies; only 3 companies are dormant, 22 companies in the process of being struck-off and the rest have been 
struck-off. 
Age      Number  As % of all PCs in same age category                        Total PCs
< 2 yrs                   3                 0%                           2,713 
≥ 2 and < 5 years               72                 2%      3,719 
≥  5 and < 10 years             310               38%          806 
≥ 10 years                                 63               46%          136 
Total               448                 6%      7,374 
Struck-off*
4.6 Number of Shareholders
The number of shareholders in a producer company can range from 10 (which is 
the minimum required to register a PC) to over 100,000 for a large milk producer 
company like Sri Vijaya Visakha Milk Producers Company (Ramana n.d.). Most 
typical companies have a few hundred shareholders; it is usually only large milk 
producer companies which have more than 10,000 shareholders. 
Information about the numbers of shareholders is not available in the MCA 
spreadsheets. However, NABARD, SFAC and a few other institutions disclose 
shareholder/ membership information for FPOs promoted by them, a cumulative 
figure which includes PCs, cooperatives, societies and other types of organisations. 
Table 4.5  Distribution of NABARD supported farmer producer organisations by 
membership 
No. of shareholders or members         Distribution of FPOs 
Upto 50                           16% 
51-100                           14% 
101-500                           56% 
501-1000                           13% 
Above 1000                            1% 
All membership categories                      100%
Source: Table 2.2, NABARD Annual Report 2017-18 
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As shown in Table 4.5, NABARD reports that 86% of FPOs supported by it have 500 
or fewer members of shareholders (NABARD 2018a).  Only 1% of FPOs have more 
than 1000 shareholders or members.  
NABARD reports that as of March 31, 2019, it had promoted 2075 FPOs with a total 
of 7.65 lakh “shareholder-members” (NABARD 2019). From this we can calculate 
the average number of shareholders per FPO promoted by NABARD to be 369.3 
Like NABARD, SFAC also does not report the number of producer-shareholders 
separately for producer companies. As of July 31, 2019, SFAC had supported 819 
registered FPOs covering 8.2 lakh producers (SFAC n.d.). Thus, the average number 
of shareholders/ members per SFAC supported FPOs was 997.  
Taking a weighted average of NABARD and SFAC supported companies (and 
assuming that the FPO average can be applied to FPCs), we arrive at an average 
number of 582 shareholders per producer company (see section 3.6). Multiplying 
this by 7374 companies in our database, we estimate that the total number of 
shareholders in producer companies in India to be about 4.3 million4. In other 
words, we estimate that over 4.3 million small producers in the country have 
become members of and contributed share capital towards 7374 producer 
companies.
4.7 Summary
In summary, 7374 producer companies have been registered in India as of March 
31, 2019 with a total of 4.3 million shareholders.  There is a strong geographical 
skew in their locations across states and across districts within states.  Roughly 
a quarter of the companies are in Maharashtra and another quarter in UP, MP 
and Telangana combined.  District-wise analysis shows that it is not necessarily 
the districts with the largest number of farmer-producers which have the largest 
number of PCs.  Many districts with large number of producers have hardly any 
producer companies. Such disparities point towards a need for re-assessing the 
geographical focus of PC promotion efforts.  
3 Here we are assuming that the average number of shareholders in FPCs is the same as that in all 
FPOs.
4 In some producer companies, shares are held directly by individual shareholders, while in 
others they are held collectively by cooperatives, farmer groups, SHG groups, and in some cases, 
even other FPCs.  For the purpose of the analysis above, we have focused on the effective size of 
producer membership as the capital is contributed ultimately by the members of these groups. 
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5. Financial Viability of PCs 
Multiple factors impact the financial viability of producer companies, of which 
operating model and capitalisation are two of the most important.  The operating 
models of producer companies depend on their choice of commodities, range of 
activities, extent of value addition, diversity of income sources and the degree of 
collaboration with other producer companies.  It is important to note that in the 
case of producer companies, the operating models also determine the frequency 
of transactions with members and influence producer loyalty and patronage, 
which in turn contribute to overall financial viability of PCs.
Financial viability also entails companies to have adequate capital to initiate and 
sustain operations and generate returns for their shareholders.  While capital is 
not the sole determinant of a company’s viability, it contributes to companies’ 
potential to grow their procurement, turnover, profitability and extend the scope 
and scale of their operations as well as attract professional management over 
time.  
This chapter presents findings related to producer companies’ operating 
models and capitalization2.  Through more than 100 interviews, we aimed to 
understand the various operating models and their associated challenges.  And, 
using the database and other secondary data, we examined the capitalisation of 
producer companies across India. Together, these findings help create a larger 
understanding of viability challenges confronting producer companies in India.
5.1 Operating Models
Shareholders of PCs are also their suppliers of primary produce and consumers 
of services such as inputs, crop insurance, etc.  PCs are dependent on their 
producer-members for their procurement volumes, which determine turnover 
and profitability. PCs can also increase their revenue by ensuring that producer-
members buy inputs and other services from them. Therefore, it is important for 
companies to sustain producer loyalty and patronage.   Maintaining producers’ 
interest in transacting with PCs (called ‘patronage’) can be a challenge if 
competitors offer better prices or convenience.  Generally, frequent transactions 
with members strengthen member loyalty over time.  Member loyalty is also partly 
influenced by the companies’ choice of operating model itself. 
1 Some parts of this chapter are largely taken from Neti, Govil and Rao (2019). 
2 While the quantitative data presented in this chapter covers both farm and non-farm companies, 
most of the discussion focuses on farmer producer companies since they constitute more than 
92% of producer companies (see Chapter 6).
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PCs engage in a variety of business activities. Farmer producer companies are 
involved in bulk procurement of inputs, primary produce trading, value addition 
and provide additional services such as extension services, crop insurance, etc. 
Non-farm producer companies are engaged in weaving, garment production, 
footwear production and other activities.  Producer companies may work with 
either single or multiple commodities. While most PCs work as stand-alone 
entities, some operate as part of a tiered structure comprising multiple PCs with 
differentiated activities and responsibilities. 
Therefore, in this section, we examine aspects of operating models which are of 
particular interest for understanding financial viability of producer companies, 
such as extent of value-addition, number of commodities, other services offered 
to members, and whether they work as stand-alone entities or as part of a multi-
company tiered structure.
Extent of Value Addition 
Many new FPCs start their operations with procuring inputs in bulk for their 
members.  Many of them work as simple intermediaries in agricultural value-
chains by aggregating produce and doing basic primary processing (such as 
grading and sorting). Some FPCs engage in value-addition such as pulping or 
juicing of fruits, chopping and freezing of vegetables, etc.  Some FPCs go further 
and produce ready-to-eat or ready-to-cook products such as breakfast cereals and 
mixes, tomato puree, etc. and non-food items such as natural holi colours. 
Such value addition allows producer companies to capture a greater proportion 
of each rupee spent by consumers, thereby increasing returns to their member-
producers.  However, value addition also requires larger capital investment 
in machinery and other assets.  Companies which are able to raise significant 
capital, are likely to generate additional revenues through value-addition and 
also generate employment for local youth and women in their processing units.  
However, as we will see later in this chapter, the majority of producer companies 
in India, are unable to do so.
Single vs. Multi-Commodity
In general, FPCs can work with either a single agricultural commodity or multiple 
commodities. Single-commodity FPCs (other than those dealing with milk and 
certain vegetables) face multiple challenges due to seasonality of production. 
For example, a paddy focused FPC’s engagement with producers is limited to 
procuring produce once-a-year, which limits the potential for developing long-term 
relationship with producers. This may adversely impact the producers’ patronage 
of the PC and result in producers selling their produce to buyers other than the 
FPC (i.e. impacting member loyalty).  This, in turn, affects FPCs’ business volume 
and profitability and also limits the benefits for their members. 
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Some single-commodity PCs try to overcome this challenge by engaging in delayed 
marketing or value addition. However, this poses a different kind of challenge. For 
instance, an FPC which processes mango pulp struggles with maintaining year-
round capacity utilization of machinery and continuing the employment of staff 
during off-season. Therefore, many successful FPCs tend to work with multiple 
agricultural commodities to ensure better capacity utilisation of resources and 
greater patronage by their members.
Additional Services 
Some FPCs aim to diversify sources of income and customer base by selling their 
produce to a variety of buyers in wholesale mandis, large traders, restaurants and 
hotels, corporate bulk buyers or directly to consumers.  Some FPCs in our study 
have become nodal agencies for procurement of agricultural commodities at 
Minimum Support Prices (MSP).  
In order to increase incomes of member-shareholders or reduce costs or risks, 
many PCs undertake additional activities.  Several have become licensed agents 
of agricultural input manufacturers or crop insurance companies; a few have 
acquired licenses for setting up diesel/ petrol bunks to supply fuel for farm 
machinery for members and non-members.  Such diversification helps minimize 
the disadvantages of working with seasonal produce, by creating more avenues 
for engagement with members throughout the year and also generating additional 
sources of income for the company.  In some FPCs which were part of our study, 
such revenue streams surpassed the revenue generated by sale of primary 
produce.  
A few FPCs and their promoters are going beyond business activities and engaging 
in advocacy, education and knowledge creation. For example, one FPC in Odisha is 
procuring medicinal herbs from adivasi members and is working with government 
bodies for obtaining intellectual property protection for indigenous herbs.  It is 
facilitating participatory documentation of local health traditions and scientific 
testing of traditional remedies. It is also working with about a thousand schools 
to incorporate knowledge of traditional healing practices into the local school 
curriculum.  Another FPC in Maharashtra which was also part of our study, is 
establishing a centre for training rural youth in agricultural processing and related 
activities, to create more opportunities for employment and entrepreneurship 
locally.
Integrated vs. Two-tier Model
While most PCs work as stand-alone entities (single-tier model), many operate 
as part of a tiered structure (two-tier model) comprising multiple PCs with 
differentiated activities and responsibilities.  In a single-tier model, one FPC 
handles the entire range of business activities from procurement to marketing. 
This model is particularly common in the dairy sector, where dairy FPCs do 
everything from procurement of raw milk, to chilling, pasteurization and 
production of value-added products and marketing of these products. 
Many successful 
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In a two-tier model, there are multiple “supplier FPCs” supplying agricultural 
commodities to a “market-facing company” which is responsible for value-addition 
and marketing3  (Figure 5.1).  The supplier FPCs typically focus on procuring a 
single agricultural commodity from their shareholders and selling to the market-
facing company.  The market-facing companies act as assured buyers for the 
supplier FPCs (usually with some minimum quality requirements).  They process 
the commodities and try to sell them to large traders, corporate buyers, retailers 
and, in some cases, exporters. The market-facing companies are registered 
either as PCs or private limited companies. In some cases, supplier FPCs own a 
few shares in the market-facing companies.  State-level federations often act as 
market-facing companies with member-FPCs acting as the supplier-FPCs.
Figure 5.1 Illustrative diagram comparing the distribution of business activities in 
single-tier and two-tier operating models
One of the biggest challenges of FPCs is raising large amounts of capital for their 
operations, either for procuring large quantity of produce or for value addition. 
This requires the creation of either a single-tier FPC with a large capital base or a 
two-tier structure which allows infusion of external capital. 
In a few cases covered in our study, single-tier FPCs were able to raise capital by 
inducting a large number of small shareholders or by including significant number 
of medium and large farmers as shareholders. Convincing a large number of 
small producers to join an FPC takes multiple procurement cycles which happens 
faster in dairy as the procurement happens daily, but much slower in cultivation 
because typically procurement happens once a year. Therefore, it is possible to 
find more than 10,000 shareholders in dairy PCs but only about 1000 shareholders 
even in many large cultivator FPCs. The second approach of raising capital by 
including large farmers as shareholders is more uncommon. Our discussions 
3 While the section describes two-tier model only for FPCs, this model is also prevalent among 
non-farm PCs, especially in textiles sector.
Single-tier FPCs Market-facing company (either FPC or Pvt. Ltd)
• Aggregation
• Grading & sorting
• Processing
• Sales & marketing
• Buy from supplier FPCs
• Processing
• Sales & marketing
Supplier FPC 1 Supplier FPC 2 Supplier FPC 3 ...
• Usually focusing on 
  single commodity or 
  small geographical 
  area
• Aggregation
• Grading & sorting
Support and training for 
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with stakeholders reveal that this is because most NGOs which promote FPCs are 
reluctant to induct large farmers because they imagine that FPCs will eventually 
grow into local institutions which empower marginal and small farmers (see more 
on ‘normative imaginations’ of stakeholders in Chapter 7).
In the case of a two-tier model, we have seen FPCs attract significant capital in 
two ways. One way was to register the market-facing company as a private limited 
company with non-producer shareholders. This was prevalent in FPCs promoted 
by social enterprises. The second way was to register the market-facing company 
as FPCs comprising mostly large farmers as shareholders. 
Furthermore, in a two-tier model, market-facing companies are able to reduce 
overall costs by providing shared accounting and compliance services to all 
supplier FPCs, the total cost of which can range from Rs. 0.5 lakh to Rs. 2 lakh 
per company per annum. They are also able to help supplier companies improve 
quality, adhere to customer requirements (e.g. certifications for export), introduce 
technology for operations management and processes for better internal 
governance.
Another challenge faced by single-tier FPCs is their inability to attract, retain 
and pay for experienced professionals. Here too, the two-tier model can help, 
by making it easier to bring in professional expertise. For example, market-
facing companies in a two-tier model can hire CEOs and other management 
professionals with business expertise and acumen, who are also able to leverage 
their business networks for the benefit of member companies. Such arrangements 
benefit all member PCs through sharing of expertise and costs. 
In summary, our study shows that the two-tier model is better suited for 
cultivation-focused companies.  This is for many reasons: raising greater capital, 
providing support services, attracting and retaining talent, better market linkages 
and sharing costs. In the long run, a two-tier model has the potential to enable 
member companies to scale-up compared to small stand-alone FPCs.
5.2 Paid-Up Capital: Overview
Most FPCs have an average of 200-500 producers as shareholders, while a few 
have more than a thousand shareholders and some dairies have more than 
10,000. The composition of shareholders varies significantly across FPCs. Some 
FPCs have only small and marginal farmers as shareholders, a few have a mix of 
small and large farmers and several restrict shareholding to certain categories, 
such as only women, only tribal producers, or only those farmers who can 
contribute a certain minimum amount of equity (e.g. one lakh rupees).  NABARD 
(NABARD 2019), SFAC and NDDB Dairy Services (NDS) report that small and 
marginal farmers account for 70-80% of the shareholders of FPCs promoted 
by them4. 
4 Field notes, 2019.
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Registered producer companies in India have a total Paid-Up Capital (PUC) of 
about Rs. 860 crore, with an average of Rs. 11.67 lakh per company, per our 
database (Table 5.1). However, it is important to note that a few companies have 
very high PUC (as described below).  For example, of the Rs. 860 crore PUC, 
Rs. 213 crore is for just one company, namely, Sri Vijaya Visakha Milk Producers 
Company Ltd. The PUC of top 20 companies including Sri Vijaya Visakha adds up 
to Rs. 502 crore, amounting to more than half of the total PUC. At the other 
extreme, there are 189 companies with Rs. 1000 or less PUC each. Therefore, 
rather than an average, it is better to examine the median PUC, which is Rs. 1.06 
lakh for all registered companies and Rs. 1.10 lakh for companies with registration 
status as ‘active’. 
Using the total estimated number of shareholders, we calculated the average 
share capital per shareholder to be Rs. 2003 for all registered PCs and Rs. 2092 
for all ‘active’ PCs. Here too, median would be the more appropriate measure, 
which was not possible to calculate as shareholder data is not available for each 
company.  If we divide the median PUC per company by the average number of 
shareholders, these numbers drastically drop to Rs. 182 and 189.  Our qualitative 
interviews show that these reduced numbers may be closer to reality.  However, 
we should be wary of drawing any conclusions and treat these numbers as 
indicative only.
Table 5.1  Aggregate characteristics of producer companies registered as of 
March 31, 2019
Since it does not make sense to analyse paid-up capital characteristics for 
companies which have been struck-off, the rest of the analysis presented in this 
section and most of the paper will be only for companies with ‘active’ status.
Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of PUC across all active companies in top 5 
states and all India. As mentioned above, the distribution of PUC is highly skewed 
across India: Across the top 5 states, median PUC varies from Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 5 
lakh.  Tamil Nadu has many companies with high PUC while Telangana has mostly 
smaller ones. Most of the Telangana PCs are very young (less than two years) and 
were formed after MCA eliminated the minimum PUC requirement as described 
later in this paper. Such differences in median PUC across states reflect the 
different histories and methods of PC promotion in these states. 
* Calculated as weighted average of NABARD and SFAC shareholder patterns (see previous section)
The top 20 
companies 
contribute to 
more than half  
of the total PUC.
                                                                                  PCs registered               PCs with ‘Active’ status 
Total number of producer companies                                           7374                                              6926
Ave. number of shareholders per company (est.)*                         582                                                582
Total number of shareholders (est.)                                      43 lakh                                          40 lakh
Total paid-up capital (PUC)                                          Rs.860.18 crore                              Rs. 843.96  crore 
Ave. PUC per producer company                            Rs.11.67 lakh                                 Rs.12.19 lakh
Median PUC per producer company                              Rs.1.06 lakh                                  Rs.1.10 lakh
Ave. PUC per shareholder (est.)                                     Rs.2003                                          Rs.2092
(Median PUC per PC) / Ave. shareholders per PC                         Rs. 182                                              Rs. 189
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Figure 5.2 Distribution of PUC of PCs in top 5 states and all India 
(for active PCs only)
As mentioned earlier, this quantitative study of data on producer companies 
is part of a larger study, which included over 100 interviews with shareholders, 
board of directors and promoters of producer companies, including visits to 
18 producer companies’ locations.  These interviews revealed a wide range of 
shareholding patterns among producer companies. For example, in one of the 
companies we visited, the share capital per farmer was around Rs. 200, while in 
another it was around Rs. 1 lakh. 
To analyse the distribution of paid-up capital across all PCs in further detail, we 
classified producer companies into four categories of paid-up capital: Category 
A with PUC of 50 lakh or more, Category B with PUC of 25 lakh (inclusive) to 50 
lakh (exclusive), Category C with PUC of 10 lakh (inclusive) to 25 lakh (exclusive) 
and Category D with PUC of less than 10 lakh. Table 5.2 shows that about 86% of 
‘active’ PCs are very small, with less than Rs. 10 lakh of paid-up capital, falling in 
Category ‘D’. Only about 2.6% of active companies have PUC greater than Rs. 25 
lakh, and fall in Categories ‘A’ or ‘B’. 
Table 5.2 Number of PCs by paid-up capital (active status companies only)
Note: The box extends from 25th to 75th percentile, while the ‘whiskers’ indicate extent of the 5th and 95th percentile.  
Line with an ‘x’ indicates median. 95th percentile for Tamil Nadu is at 20.5 lakh.
PUC category         Definition                                       No. of ‘active’ PCs                % of total   
Category A         PUC ≥ 50 lakh                                                                  90                        1.3%
Category B         PUC ≥ 25 and <50 lakh                                               87                        1.3%
Category C         PUC ≥10 and <25 lakh                                             767                     11.1%
Category D         PUC < 10 lakh                                                             5982                    86.4% 
                            Of which:  
                           PUC ≥ 5 and < 10 lakh                                           1465                     21.2%
                            PUC > 1 and < 5 lakh                                           1146                     16.5%
                           PUC = 1 lakh                                                             2680                     38.7%
                            PUC < 1 lakh                                                                691                     10.0%
All categories                                                                                  6926                   100.0%
Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding
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Large PCs (Category A) appear to be concentrated in a few states (Table 5.3).  
Kerala has the greatest number of large producer companies in Category ‘A’, with 
PUC more than Rs. 50 lakh.  Many of these companies have been promoted under 
various government schemes, such as those under Coconut Development Board.  
We visited one such coconut producer company and found that the average share 
capital contributed per member was about Rs. 5400 with the minimum being Rs. 
2500 and maximum being Rs. 1 lakh. Many of the shareholders in the coconut PC 
were engaged in full-time jobs with coconut farming being a secondary source of 
income. This additional source of income may partially explain their capacity to 
contribute higher share capital, compared to the average small producers.
Table 5.3  Top 10 states with most number of  Category A PCs (companies with 
‘active’ status only)
Despite the largest number of PCs having been registered in Maharashtra, the 
number of PCs with share capital greater than Rs. 50 lakh is only 11, which is less 
than half that of Kerala. Other states have even fewer number of large companies.  
Interestingly, Uttar Pradesh, the state with second largest number of PCs, does not 
feature in this list of top 10 states with the most number of Category A 
PCs (Figure 5.3).
In fact, only 8% of PCs in Maharashtra have PUC of Rs. 10 lakh or more.  The 
southern states have better capitalised companies on average:  Of the active 
producer companies in Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu have about one-third 
have Rs. 10 lakh or greater PUC, which more than the national average of 14%.  In 
contrast, the proportion of well-capitalised companies in states such as Odisha, 
Telangana and Rajasthan is less than half the national average.
                                                                                PUC Category
                                         A  (≥50)          B (≥25 and <50)          C (≥10 and <25)             D (<10)    Total PCs
Kerala                               28                                16                                 28                    133              205
Maharashtra             11                                17                               126                 1723           1877
Tamil Nadu               5                                14                               135                   333             487
Madhya Pradesh              5                                  5                                 35                   368             413
Haryana                                 5                                  4                                 38                  251             298
Telangana              5                                 2                                 10                   383             400
Andhra Pradesh              5                                  2                                 10                  207              224
Karnataka                               4                                  5                               125                 225              359
Rajasthan                                 4                                  1                                  16                  307                         328
Assam                                  3                                   4                                   9                     91              107
Includes only companies with 'active' status
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Figure 5.3  Percentage of active producer companies with PUC ≥ Rs. 10 lakh
20%10-19%<10%
Percentage of active 
producer companies 
with PUC ≥ Rs. 10 lakh
Note: The map is based on Census 2001 district boundaries. Data for districts created after Census 2001 have been 
combined with previous district boundaries.
State                                   PUC ≥ Rs. 10L             PUC < Rs. 10L                Total
Karnataka                                             134                              225                  359            37%
Kerala                                                72                              133                  205            35%
Tamil Nadu                            154                              333                   487            32%
West Bengal                              48                               203                   251            19%
Uttar Pradesh                             111                              579                 690            16%
Haryana                                                 47                              251                  298             16%
Madhya Pradesh                              45                              368                   413             11%
Bihar                                                 25                              263                  288              9%
Maharashtra                           154                            1723                 1877              8%
Andhra Pradesh                             17                              207                  224               8%
Rajasthan                                                21                              307                   328                6%
Telangana                              17                             383                  400               4%
Orissa                                                12                             332                  344              3%
All India                                              944                            5982                6926            14%
Active producer companies
For states with more than 200 active PCs
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                                                                               Age of producer company
PUC Category                 < 2 years           ≥ 2  and < 5 years        ≥ 5 and < 10 years       10+ years      All ages
A ≥ 50 lakh                1%                    1%                      6%         23%             1%
B ≥ 25 and <50 lakh               0%                    1%                      6%           5%             1%
C  ≥ 10 and <25 lakh               8%                   13%                    18%         12%           11%
D  <10 lakh              92%                   85%                    71%         59%           86%
Total                               100%                 100%                  100%       100%         100%
Includes only those companies with 'active' registration status
Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding
It is important to note that larger PUC need not necessarily imply greater turnover 
and profitability. However, it does indicate availability of funds for higher trading 
volumes, investment in fixed assets, value addition and other purposes. In 
principle, it also indicates the possibility of leveraging the capital to raise working 
capital and term loans for business operations. In addition, PUC is also a measure 
of farmers' commitment to the PC. Thus, PUC indicates the possibility of a 
business growing, generating returns for shareholders and becoming viable in the 
long-run (but does not guarantee it). 
One of the main reasons for promoting producer companies is that they offer 
an avenue for pooling small amounts of capital from large numbers of people 
into greater sums for creating scalable and viable businesses.  However, as 
shown above, the majority of companies are under-capitalized.  One promoting 
institution we interviewed, which has promoted more than a hundred companies 
estimates that an FPC working with foodgrain farmers requires funds of at least 
Rs. 30,000 per member (Rs. 10,000 for providing inputs and Rs. 20,000 for trading 
in foodgrains).  This implies that a small FPC with 200 members would require Rs. 
60 lakh for smooth operations.  And, for early stage PCs, NABKISAN estimates that 
Rs. 15-20 lakh is required to commence operations, of which 3-5 lakh must come 
from equity which can be leveraged 4:1 for loans (NABKISAN n.d.).
But the current median PUC is only about one lakh rupees, which is much 
lower than that needed for commencing and maintaining business activities at 
reasonable scale. It is unlikely that the such a large deficit can be filled by loans. 
Next, we examine whether PUC increases with age of producer companies.
Table 5.4 shows that it does: Among older companies, a larger percentage have 
PUC greater than 50 lakh compared to younger companies.  However, despite this 
broad trend, we find that 59% of older companies (10+ years) continue to have 
PUC of less than Rs. 10 lakh. 
Table 5.4 Distribution of producer companies by PUC and age
59% of older 
companies 
(10+ years) 
continue to have 
PUC of less than 
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PUC also appears to be linked with the likelihood of being struck-off.  Our analysis 
shows that among PCs which are 5 years or older, the likelihood of being struck-
off decreases with higher PUC: About 45% of Category D companies have been 
struck off but only 4% of Category A companies have been struck-off. This could 
be due to multiple reasons.  It could be that companies with greater capital are 
likely to have more robust business operations while under-capitalized companies 
may be struggling to keep their business afloat.  Or it could be that companies 
with larger capital base may have more established operations, and can afford 
to hire accountants to prepare and submit audited financials to MCA and meet 
compliance requirements.  This relationship might also be due to another factor: 
It is possible that some resource institutions may promote robust companies 
which have both characteristics (higher PUC and better compliance with MCA 
requirements). 
5.3 Top 20 Producer Companies, by PUC
We examined the largest 20 producer companies with the highest paid-up capital, 
to get a better understanding of the characteristics of these companies.  As shown 
in Table 5.6, eight of the top 20 companies are less than 5 years old, which shows 
that many of these companies were able to raise significant amount of capital 
fairly quickly. Their combined paid-up capital is Rs. 502 crore, amounting to almost 
60% of the total PUC of all companies.
Seven of the companies are located in Kerala and supported by the Coconut 
Development Board.  In terms of sectoral activities, out of the top 20 companies, 
10 are dairies5, 8 are plantations (mostly coconut), one is cultivation related 
(fruits and vegetables) and one works on poultry.  Five of the dairies are older 
cooperatives which have subsequently been converted to PCs.  The Madhya 
Pradesh Poultry company was also converted from a cooperative to PC.  It seems 
that cultivation focused companies find it difficult to raise large amounts of capital 
as only one cultivation company appears in the top 20. It also is pertinent to note 
that Sahyadri FPCL, the only cultivation company in the top 20, is a self-funded 
company with more than 8000 shareholders, several of whom are large farmers 
who have contributed tens of lakhs (or more) in share capital (Sahyadri FPCL n.d., 
Sahyadri FPCL 2018). 
5 The two Karimnagar PCs appear to be sister companies, with 3 shared directors. However, 
they have distinct CINs and financials. The second company appears to have been formed later, 
focusing on processing milk into value added products.
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Table 5.5  Top 20 producer companies with the largest paid-up capital 
Most of the top 20 companies appear to have received some form of government 
support, either during their time as cooperatives or as producer companies (or 
both).  While one cannot attribute their achievements to government support 
alone, most companies we interviewed valued the government support they 
received during their formative years.
5.4 Companies with Low Paid-Up Capital
As noted above, 86% of producer companies have PUC lower than Rs. 10 lakh.  
Therefore, it is worthwhile to examine companies in Category D more closely.    
Table 5.6  shows that 42% of Category D companies are less than 2 years old.  But 
the vast majority (58%) are 2 years or older and apparently have been unable to 
increase their capital to a significant level over the years. 
                                          Paid Up Capital                          Women       
Company name                                (Rs. Crore)           Sector     only     Registration    State
 Sri Vijaya Visakha Milk                             213              Dairy            FY06   Andhra 
Producers Co.                                                                                                                                    Pradesh
Sahyadri Farmers Producer Co.               55            Fruits & veg                              FY11              Maharashtra 
Sangam Milk Producer Co.                 50                Dairy            FY14           Andhra Pradesh 
Paayas Milk Producer Co.                  37               Dairy            FY13                   Rajasthan 
Maahi Milk Producer Co.                  35               Dairy            FY13   Gujarat 
Saahaj Milk Producer Co.                  23               Dairy            FY15               Uttar Pradesh 
Karimnagar Milk Producer Co.                 16                Dairy            FY13                   Telangana 
Shreeja Mahila Milk Producer Co.            14                Dairy        Yes           FY15           Andhra Pradesh 
Baani Milk Producer Co.                  10                Dairy            FY15                    Punjab 
Shree Chhatrapati Shahu Milk                 10                Dairy            FY09               Maharashtra 
& Agro Producer Co.    
Madhya Pradesh Women Poultry              6               Poultry        Yes           FY07                    Madhya
Producers Co.                                                                                                                   Pradesh 
Karimnagar Milk Farmers                       5               Dairy             FY17                  Telangana
Development Producer Co. 
Vadakara Coconut Farmers                         4              Coconut            FY16                    Kerala 
Producer Co.   
Begoti Tea Producer Co.                     4  Tea            FY14                    Assam 
Palakkad Coconut Producer Co.                 4              Coconut            FY14                    Kerala 
Perambra Coconut Producer Co.   3              Coconut            FY15                    Kerala 
Thirukochi Coconut Producer Co.   3              Coconut            FY14                    Kerala 
Tirur Coconut Producer Co.                     3              Coconut            FY15   Kerala 
Onattukara Coconut Producer Co.             3              Coconut            FY15   Kerala 
Kaipuzha Coconut Producer Co.                 3              Coconut            FY14   Kerala
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Age Category                  Number                   % of total
< 2 yrs                                         2,484                            42%
≥ 2 and <5                       3,101                            52%
≥ 5 and < 10                          354                              6%
≥ 10                                               43                              1%
All ages                                         5,982                          100%
Only shows companies with active status
Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding
Table 5.6 Age distribution of companies less than Rs. 10 lakh of PUC (active 
companies only)
We further classified Category D companies further into 4 categories, namely, 
companies with PUC below 1 lakh, with exactly 1 lakh, between 1 and 5 lakh, and 
between 5 to 10 lakh (Table 5.2).  About 21% of all companies have PUC between 
5 and 10 lakh.  Thirty-nine percent of the 6926 active PCs have a PUC of exactly 
1 lakh.  This is understandable because until recently companies needed a 
minimum PUC of 1 lakh to be able to incorporate under the Companies Act (this 
was applicable for all companies, not only producer companies).  Therefore, it is 
not surprising that a large number of companies were registered with this level of 
PUC. However, it is worth noting that these companies have not increased their 
PUC since then. The requirement of Rs. 1 lakh minimum PUC for incorporation 
of companies was eliminated in 2015 for all private limited companies, not only 
producer companies (GOI 2015).
To put it differently, we can conclude that out of 6926 active producer companies, 
3498 (51%) continue to have very low level of paid-up capital even 2 or more 
years after their incorporation. This is worrying because such low PUC limits a 
company’s ability to carry out business activities (see later ‘Discussion’ section on 
under-capitalized producer companies).
5.5 Discussion: Under-capitalized Producer Companies
Central and state governments appear to view producer companies as key to 
improving small producers’ incomes.  They have spent over Rs. 2000 crore to 
promote and support producer companies over seventeen years (approximately 
Rs. 30 lakh per PC), through NABARD, SFAC and various government departments 
such as Department of Horticulture and others6. Many private philanthropies and 
CSR organisations have also funded producer companies. 
6 See Chapter 3.
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The outcome of this tremendous effort has been the incorporation of over seven 
thousand producer companies covering an estimated 4.3 million small and 
marginal producers as their shareholders.  The typical producer company in India 
today is engaged in farm-related activities and has paid-up capital of about Rs. 
1 lakh. This amount is inadequate to carry out substantial business activities, or 
have a significant impact on incomes of their members.  Previous studies have 
also pointed out that equity mobilization of PCs must be higher in order to create 
and sustain member loyalty and patronage (Kanitkar 2016, Singh 2016).
While paid-up capital is not a determinant of a company’s success, it does indicate 
the potential of a company in terms of its trading volumes, turnover, ability to 
raise working capital and term loans, etc.  Our interviews with a large number 
of producers, board members, CEOs, promoting institutions, funders and other 
stakeholders also validate these findings:  most companies with low paid-up 
capital are struggling to initiate and maintain business operations.  
In principle, there are five ways to increase funds available to a company: a) 
increase contribution from members, b) equity grants, c) leverage equity to avail 
of term loans, d) raise working capital loans, and e) generate surplus by running a 
profitable business.  
Our discussions with promoters and producers revealed that producers are 
hesitant to contribute share capital to young companies, especially if they do not 
perceive significant benefits. This is consistent with observations made in previous 
papers (Kanitkar 2016). In fact, in order to build up equity, many companies resort 
to deducting share capital amount from money payable to members for produce 
supplied. In a few companies promoted by well-off farmers, there have been 
instances where some members paid the share capital on behalf of others to 
register the PC and commence operations.  
The second approach of equity grants has been tried by SFAC and others to help 
PCs with small producers increase their equity.  Before proceeding further, it is 
useful to understand the desired level of equity required by an FPC which is just 
beginning operations. As discussed above, NABKISAN estimates that new PCs 
require Rs. 15-20 lakh for starting operations, with at least 3-5 lakh coming from 
equity (NABKISAN n.d.) and the rest from debt. Currently, the typical median 
producer company has a PUC of only Rs. 1.10 lakh leaving a gap of about ~
Rs. 3 lakh.  If this equity gap has to be raised from grants, a one-to-one equity 
grant is inadequate; instead it would require a 3:1 match. In any case, such equity 
grants have multiple eligibility criteria (and, rightly so), therefore many PCs do not 
qualify for them. 
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An alternative could be to enable external capital to be invested in FPCs: NABARD 
has proposed amending the Companies Act to make provision for equity 
participation by private investors to strengthen FPC balance sheets and improve 
their commercial viability, along the lines of the finance ecosystem for commercial 
start-ups (NABARD 2019).  In such a scenario, the social objectives of the FPCs can 
be maintained by enabling external investment through a different class of shares 
(for example, shares with no voting rights) and restricting the maximum amount of 
equity per external investor relative to farmers’ equity.
The third and fourth approaches for increasing funds are through short and 
long-term loans. Most PCs do not have enough equity or fixed assets to raise 
loans.  Banks are extremely hesitant to offer loans to producer companies even 
against inventory as collateral.  And, despite initiatives such as credit guarantee 
schemes and inclusion of loans up to Rs. 2 crore for FPOs under priority sector 
lending (RBI 2015), formal financial support for FPOs remains weak.  According 
to NABARD, “Lack of funds is often one of the constraints reported by FPOs. 
Access to affordable credit is limited for want of collateral and credit history” 
(NABARD 2018).  This point was also reiterated by almost all the respondents 
during our visits and interviews with farmers, PC board members and promoting 
organisations. 
As formal financial sources are not easily accessible, some PCs resort to borrowing 
from informal sources. In our study, we encountered one case where the village 
Pradhan who was also a member of the producer company extended a loan 
to the company from his personal funds.  In another case, a large local trader 
contributed a significant amount of share capital as a 'gesture of goodwill' and 
support even though he conducted his personal trading activities outside of the 
company.
We also came across multiple cases where SHG federations gave working capital 
loans to affiliated ‘sister’ PCs with largely overlapping membership. This is a risky 
approach as the source of funds for SHG federations are savings of members, 
who are already financially vulnerable and may not be in a position to evaluate 
the risk / return of lending to PCs; any default by the PC would result in a loss of 
their savings (Govil and Neti n.d.).   Furthermore, in principle, SHG federations are 
expected to lend only to their member groups and not to external entities such as 
FPCs, despite significant overlap in membership. 
The fifth approach of generating surplus to fund the business seems to be a 
distant goal as of now for most producer companies. Often these companies 
struggle to run business operations (for lack of working capital) and generate 
profits.  In fact, in many cases, instead of increasing equity through retained 
earnings, their total equity is eroding due to repeated losses (as evident in their 
balance sheets).
"Policymakers 
should consider 
allowing 
external capital 
in PCs through a 
class of 
non-voting 
shares, with 
restrictions on 
the maximum 
amount of equity 
per external 
investor, relative 
to farmers' total 
equity."
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Thus, for producer companies with low equity, none of the above approaches 
for raising funds seem feasible.  As a result, companies find themselves limited 
by shareholder equity as the primary source of funds. For example, imagine a 
company with 200 shareholders, with an average share capital of Rs. 500 per 
shareholder, for a total of Rs. 1 lakh.  With such limited funds, such a company 
will be able to procure only a small amount of inventory, comprising only a 
small percentage of the produce of its shareholders, and thus contribute only 
an insignificant amount to the producers’ total annual income.  It is difficult to 
imagine how such a company can survive, let alone grow its operations, turnover 
and profit.  It is pertinent to repeat here that 49% of 6926 active producer 
companies have PUC of Rs. 1 lakh or less and would find themselves in such a 
situation.  As pointed out earlier in this chapter, a few PCs which are part of a two-
tier model are able to overcome this challenge if the market-facing company is 
well funded. 
Of course, in addition to adequate finance, producer companies also need many 
other kinds of support. They need strong guidance in analysing business potential, 
planning operations, achieving financial viability, and instituting strong governance 
and regulatory compliance mechanisms. They also require an accessible business 
ecosystem of suppliers, traders, value-addition and processing partners, as well as 
a well-trained talent pool for managing operations (Govil 2018).  Access to finance 
is necessary but not sufficient for business initiation and growth.  However, the 
absence of adequate finance (in the form of capital or debt) makes most producer 
companies unable to even start operations at a meaningful scale, leaving them 
sub-scale or practically defunct.  
5.6 Summary and Recommendations
The median share capital per producer company is quite low, at approximately Rs. 
1.1 lakh.  86% of producer companies have PUC lower than Rs. 10 lakh and do not 
have the minimum required capital to start operations at meaningful scale. This 
thwarts the attempts of various government and non-government stakeholders 
to increase small producers’ incomes. There are multiple possible ways to address 
undercapitalisation: introducing a different class of shares with no voting rights, 
larger equity grants offering more than a 1:1 match and multiple types of working 
capital and term loans with and without credit guarantees.  
As noted above, financial viability of producer companies depends largely on their 
capitalisation and operating model. The most desirable operating models are 
those that involve frequent transactions with members, increase their incomes 
significantly and attract large amount of capital and loans. Often this requires 
PCs to procure multiple commodities from their producers, offer a diverse set of 
services and undertake processing and value-addition.  Companies which are able 
to do this are in a better position to hold their members’ loyalty and patronage.
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In districts and blocks with large number of subscale PCs, it may be prudent to 
consolidate multiple PCs into one reasonably sized company with higher number 
of members and more share capital. Consolidation across multiple commodities 
will also help utilizing the same capital for procurement of different commodities 
at different times during the year. A stronger balance sheet and increased 
business activities would also improve the likelihood of the consolidated FPC 
attracting formal sector loans. In fact, it appears that the Government of Madhya 
Pradesh and one other social sector resource institutions are thinking along 
similar lines, and attempting to scale-up existing PCs by adding new members 
rather than promoting new ones.  
Financial viability of PCs can also be improved through two-tier operating models 
which bring multiple benefits to their member PCs. Since the market-facing 
companies in two-tier models are usually better capitalised, they are able to 
attract experienced talent with business acumen and provide value-addition 
and better market linkages. They are also able to reduce costs through shared 
services for accounting, regulatory compliance, certification, etc. and help member 
companies set-up strong governance processes.
Some undercapitalized companies may continue to struggle due to weak business 
potential and erode shareholder equity despite such efforts. It may be necessary, 
in such cases, to close down such producer companies and transfer any remaining 
funds back to the producers. 
Producer-shareholders of producer companies have invested a total of Rs. 860 
crore as share capital in 7374 companies. This is substantial considering that 
most of the shareholders are small producers with limited savings.  Since this 
amount is quite significant (even in comparison to the estimated Rs. 2000 crores 
spent on mobilisation and support of PCs by government and non-government 
stakeholders), it is imperative to refine the design of producer companies to create 
operational conditions which enable their success.
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6. Selected Categories of PCs
In this section, we discuss characteristics of selected categories of PCs, namely, 
those engaged in dairying, non-farm livelihoods, and those owned exclusively by 
women producers. 
The identification of sectoral activities of companies is rather difficult as the 
activity code designated for many companies in their registration forms is 
unreliable.  Therefore, instead of MCA activity codes, we relied on words in 
the names of companies (e.g. farmers, vegetable producers, dairy, weavers, 
hastkala, etc.) and activity information included in company lists published by 
various funding and promoter organizations. In some cases, we were able to get 
information on sectoral activities from company websites and other information 
on the internet.  Out of 6926 active producer companies, we were able to identify 
sectoral activities of 93% of the companies.  
6.1 Milk Producer Companies (Dairies) 
Milk producer companies were identified based on words (e.g. milk, dairy, doodh, 
dugdh, etc.) in their names, lists of PCs and their activities published by various 
institutions, and information available on company websites.  There are 210 milk 
producer companies (MPCs) with active status, corresponding to about 3% of all 
active producer companies in India. Most MPCs are quite young, having been 
registered less than 5 years ago (Table 6.1).   
Table 6.1 Age of Milk Producer Companies with active status 
More than half the active MPCs are in just four states: Maharashtra, Rajasthan, 
Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh (Table 6.2).  The dairy PCs have contributed 
Rs. 437 crore in PUC, constituting about 52% of the total PUC of all 6926 active PCs. 
About 10% of milk producer companies have PUC greater than Rs. 50 lakh; this 
proportion is much greater compared to all producer companies (Table 6.3).  The 
median PUC of milk producer companies is Rs. 2.63 lakh, which is more than 2.5 
times that of all PCs.  As mentioned earlier, 10 of the top 20 companies are dairies.
Age of MPCs                    Number                 Percentage
< 2 years                               47                             22%
>=2 and <5 years                124                             59%
>= 5 and < 10 years                               28                             13%
>=10 years                              11                               5%
All ages                                              210                           100%
Only shows companies with active status
Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding
The dairy PCs 
have contributed 
Rs. 437 crore in 
PUC, constituting 
about 52% of the 
total PUC of all 
6926 active PCs. 
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The larger PUC of dairies is not surprising, as dairies tend to have large number 
of shareholders which often results in greater PUC.  Secondly, many milk PCs 
have been converted from older dairy cooperatives with significant membership 
and capital. Furthermore, even new dairies find it relatively easier to ramp up 
their membership and operations quickly because the dairy sector has a well-
established blueprint for collectivisation, procurement, processing and sales.
Table 6.2  Milk Producer Company registrations by state (active companies only) 
Table 6.3  Milk producer companies by PUC categories (active companies only) 
6.2 Non-farm Producer Companies 
About 92% of all PCs registered are working on agriculture and allied activities, 
such as cultivation, plantations, dairies, non-timber forest produce, fish, poultry, 
etc. (Table 6.4).  Only about 1% of all PCs registered (75 companies) are engaged in 
non-farm activities. Thirty companies are engaged in weaving and apparel-making, 
19 in handicraft production, 6 in food processing (jams, pickles, etc.), and the rest 
in making agarbatti, footwear, etc.  
The first non-farm producer company was registered on 27 August 2004 in Tamil 
Nadu – Kongu Weavers Producer Company, roughly 14 months after the first FPC.  
Currently this company has active status and paid-up capital of Rs. 6,50,500. 
PUC category         Number              Percentage              Number                Percentage
PUC ≥ 50 lakh                  22             10%                        90                      1%
PUC ≥ 25 and < 50 lakh 7               3%                        87                      1%
PUC ≥ 10 and < 25 lakh            16               8%                      767                          11%
PUC < 10 lakh               165                            79%                    5982                     86%
All Categories               210           100%                    6926                   100%
Dairies                                                               All PCs
State                             Number         Percentage
Maharashtra                                 35                     17%
Rajasthan                                       28                     13%
Madhya Pradesh                     28                     13%
Uttar Pradesh                     26                     12%
Tamil Nadu                     15                      7%
Haryana                                       13                      6%
Bihar                                       12                      6%
Others                                       53                     25%
All states                               210                    100%
Only shows companies with active status
Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding
Only shows companies with active status
Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding
Only about 1% of 
all PCs registered 
(75 companies) 
are engaged 
in non-farm 
activities.
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Table 6.4  Producer companies by sector (active companies only) 
Table 6.5 shows the PUC distribution of active non-farm companies: 5 companies 
have PUC greater than Rs. 25 lakh. Sixty-four producer companies (85%) have 
PUC of less than 10 lakh, a proportion similar to that of farm-based PCs.  Table 
6.6 shows that the majority of non-farm producer companies (76%) are 2 years or 
older. 
Table 6.5  Non-farm producer companies, by PUC  (active companies only)
Table 6.6  Non-farm producer companies, by age (active companies only)
6.3 Women in Producer Companies
Many interventions during the last three decades have focused on mobilising and 
forming women’s collectives and self-help groups (SHGs) for savings and credit, 
access to other financial services, common resource management and promoting 
home based-entrepreneurial activities. Many of these interventions have also built 
women’s capabilities in financial literacy and strengthened collective responsibility 
among SHG members. Therefore, it was only natural that when NGOs and other 
PUC category            Number      Percentage
A ≥ 50 lakh                                       3                     4%
B ≥ 25 and < 50 lakh                        2                     3%
C ≥10 and < 25 lakh                        6                     8%
D < 10 lakh                     64                    85%
All categories                     75                   100%
Age category           Number        Percentage
< 2 years                                       18                    24%
>-2 and < 5 years                     33                    44% 
≥ 5 and < 10 years                     17                    23%
≥ 10 years                                        7                      9%
All ages                                       75                  100%
Sector                               Number         Percentage
Farm                                     6391                      92%
Non-farm                                         75                        1%
Unclear sector*                    460                        7%
All sectors                  6926                    100%
* Refers to PCs whose sectoral activities could not be identified clearly 
Only shows companies with ‘active’ status
Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding 
Only shows companies with ‘active’ status
Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding
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promoting institutions were enlisted by the government to promote producer 
companies in the country, SHGs and other women’s collectives were seen as the 
logical foundation on which PCs could be built. Leveraging existing SHGs was of 
interest for another reason too: women’s participation is included as one of the 
social development indicators on which PCs are evaluated by NABARD and other 
government institutions (NABARD 2015). 
The Producer Companies Act 2002 provides for producer groups and institutions 
including existing informal collectives of women such as SHGs to be shareholders 
in PCs. In our interviews, we came across examples of SHGs which were 
shareholders in PCs; in several other cases, many individual members of SHGs are 
shareholders in the PC. Ten out of 24 companies we interviewed had their origins 
in women’s SHGs. Many of these were women-only PCs while others included men 
also as shareholders.
While it was not possible to ascertain the number (and gender) of shareholders 
of all producer companies in the database, we were able to identify several PCs 
which were owned exclusively by women producers.  Among the 6926 producer 
companies with active status, 184 have only women members.  These were 
identified based on words (e.g. mahila, women, naari, etc.) in their names, lists of 
PCs published by various institutions, and information available on their websites. 
If a women-only PC does not have such an identifier in its name, it may not appear 
in our list of women-only PCs. The membership in these all-women PCs varies 
from several thousands (in large dairy PCs) to few hundreds (in farm and 
non-farm PCs).
The very first women-only PC registered in the country was Madhya Pradesh 
Women Poultry Producers Company incorporated in May 2006. It was originally 
promoted under the Madhya Pradesh District Poverty Initiative Project (DPIP). 
Currently it has 4214 women members organised into 10 cooperatives (Madhya 
Pradesh Women Poultry PCL n.d.), and is the second largest women-only PC in the 
country in terms of PUC. 
Table 6.7  Sectoral activities of women-only producer companies
Only shows companies with active status
Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding
Sector                                         Number            Percentage                      Number             Percentage
Milk producer companies                 13                            7%                              210                    3%
Other farm-related companies                150           82%                            6181                   89%
Non-farm companies                                     7              4%                               75              1%
Companies with unclear activities             14                             8%            460                     7%
All Sectors                                   184          100%          6926                 100%
Women-only PCs                                                  All PCs
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Table 6.8  State-wise distribution of women-only PCs 
Seven percent of the women-only PCs in the country are engaged in dairying, 
which is more than double the proportion for all PCs (Table 6.7).  82% are engaged 
in other types of farm-related activities, and 7 in non-farm activities.  More than 
half the women-only producer companies are in just 3 states: Maharashtra, 
Madhya Pradesh and Odisha (Table 6.8). Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, states 
with the second and third largest number of PCs respectively, do not seem to have 
any women-only PCs as of March 31, 2019. However, they have several PCs with 
both men and women shareholders.
The PUC distribution of women-only producer companies is similar to all PCs, with 
86% of them being in Category D (Table 6.9).  The median PUC is Rs. 1.00 lakh, 
which is slightly lower than all active PCs’ median of Rs. 1.10 lakh.  However, a 
greater proportion of women-only PCs are in higher PUC categories.  
Table 6.9  PUC distribution of women-only PCs
Sector                            Number                      Percentage
Maharashtra                   36                      20%
Madhya Pradesh                   34                                  18%
Odisha                                      24                      13%
Rajasthan                                      19                      10%
Telangana                   13                       7%
Bihar                                      12                       7%
Jharkhand                                10                       5%
Other states                    36                       20%
All states                                   184                     100%
PUC category              Number                Percentage                  Number              Percentage
PUC ≥ 50 lakh                          7                       4%                            90                         1%
PUC ≥ 25 and < 50 lakh       3                       2%                           87                         1%
PUC ≥ 10 and < 25 lakh                    15                       8%                        767                           11%
PUC < 10 lakh                  159                              86%                       5982                      86%
All Categories                       184                    100%                       6926                    100%
Women-only PCs                                            All PCs
Only shows companies with active status
Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding
Only shows companies with active status
Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding  
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Table 6.10 Top 10 women-only producer companies, based on PUC
Table 6.10 shows the top 10 women-only producer companies in India, based 
on PUC: Roughly half of them have PUC more than Rs. 1 crore.  Most of these 
companies are less than 5 years old. Most of these companies have received 
support from state or central governments. It is not surprising that 5 of the 
top 10 women-only PCs are in the dairy sector. The idea of forming women-
only collectives in the dairy sector has a long history originating from the 
‘White Revolution’ that recognized and supported women’s contribution to milk 
production in the country. 
Women’s Role in PCs
In cases where promoting institutions emphasized participation of women, 
women producers were involved in various activities of producer companies: 
running village level aggregation centres, doing primary grading and sorting, 
operating machinery for processing and preparing ready-to-eat products. They 
also worked as resource persons for extension activities and mobilising new 
members. Some of them were on the boards of producer companies as directors. 
In most PCs, board members are expected to manage the business and its 
financials. We met several women board members who were SHG leaders and 
had many years of affiliation with the promoting institutions. They had been 
trained in basic financial literacy and book-keeping for maintaining SHG records. 
However, this basic knowledge is not adequate for maintaining business accounts 
for 500 plus member PCs or for understanding the complex financial and 
regulatory requirements of PCs. Further, many had been encouraged and trained 
to take responsibilities of vendor and buyer negotiations and interactions with 
government functionaries, although their understanding of business decisions 
                                                                                  Paid-up         
                                                                                    Capital 
Company Name                                                  (Rs.Crore)         Sector             Registration              State
Shreeja Mahila Milk PCL              14.48          Dairy                    FY15           Andhra Pradesh
Madhya Pradesh Women Poultry PCL                     6.11          Poultry                 FY07           Madhya Pradesh
Satpura Women Silk PCL                 1.96          Silk                       FY17            Madhya Pradesh
Sakhi Mahila Milk PCL                 1.10          Dairy                    FY16                  Rajasthan
Asha Mahila Milk PCL                 1.04          Dairy                    FY16                  Rajasthan
Intivelugu Mahila Dairy PCL                 0.61          Dairy                    FY10                 Telangana
Ram Rahim Pragati PCL                 0.59          Cultivation          FY13            Madhya Pradesh
Shwetdhara Mahila Mlk PCL                0.48          Dairy                    FY17              Uttar Pradesh
IB Shurshti Women Livelihoods Services PCL         0.43          Cultivation          FY17                    Odisha
Narishakti Agriculture PCL                0.36          Cultivation          FY17                  Rajasthan
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and their implications remained limited1. However, in a few exceptional cases, we 
found women board members who were highly educated, better connected, had 
greater exposure to the world of business, and were well equipped to manage the 
business. 
It is pertinent to note that participation in greater numbers or roles with greater 
responsibilities do not necessarily signal greater empowerment of women 
producers.  While some women may develop deeper capabilities for handling 
certain aspects of their businesses, their status in broader economic, social and 
personal spheres remains limited (Tandon 2019, Batliwala 2010).
6.4 Summary
Almost all producer companies registered in the country are farmer producer 
companies.  In recent years, many milk cooperatives have been converted to milk 
producer companies, and many new dairies have been established directly as PCs.  
Not surprisingly, dairies tend to have large number of shareholders and greater 
paid-up capital than other types of PCs. 
Given the thrust on women’s participation in livelihoods interventions, it is 
surprising that there are only about 200 women-only PCs. Other researchers 
have also pointed out that women’s representation in FPCs is lower than in other 
types of FPOs (Gowda MJ, Dixit and Megha 2018).  In their efforts to increase 
women’s participation, promoting institutions must be careful not to overburden 
women as they are already burdened with primary production and household 
responsibilities.  
There is no doubt that small and marginal women producers would benefit from 
membership in producer collectives, including PCs. Therefore it is important 
to increase their membership in PCs as shareholders and invest in efforts to 
strengthen these PCs. 
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7. Normative Imaginations of PCs 
and their Implications
There are many different stakeholders involved in the promotion and support 
of producer companies, such as, producers, promoting organisations, funding 
providers, various government departments and institutions and other social 
sector entities interested in farmer welfare. There is a substantial variation among 
PCs in the way they are promoted, the way they function and the extent of support 
provided by the external stakeholders. We find that this variation is partly the 
result of significant differences in stakeholders’ imagination of the purpose of PCs 
and how they should function. 
In this chapter, we discuss findings from our qualitative study comprising over 100 
in-depth interviews of stakeholders in producer companies, such as producers, 
board members, funders, promoting institutions and others. We begin with a 
description of the normative imaginations of stakeholders and how this affects 
the producers’ sense of individual and collective ownership of the company, and 
the importance they give to the need for business acumen for management of 
producer companies. We discuss how this imagination also influences the kind 
of enabling ecosystem, internal governance and compliance mechanisms they 
establish.  While the comments in this chapter are based on interviews with 
stakeholders of producer companies primarily in the agricultural sector, the 
comments are also relevant for producer companies in other sectors.
7.1 Normative imaginations of stakeholders 
Our study shows that small farmers see producer companies primarily as non-
exploitative buyers and service providers. For instance, most small farmer-
shareholders in the study were keen that the PC should procure almost everything 
they produce at market prices or higher with greater transparency and faster 
payment cycles. They also expected to buy good quality inputs at reasonable 
prices from the producer company. They hoped that in the long-run, the producer 
company will be able to provide them steady income with minimum risk. 
We find that farmers in PCs promoted by NGOs often see themselves as 
‘beneficiaries’. This is because, in many cases, NGOs have been working in the 
same communities for many years, implementing projects such as watershed 
development, productivity enhancement, market linkages and linking to various 
government welfare schemes. Therefore, farmers assume that PCs are yet another 
farmer welfare initiative of the NGO rather than their own business enterprises. 
76
Most farmers are not clear about their role as business owners and hence do 
not see the need to invest their money and time in FPCs. In fact, many producer-
shareholders view their financial contribution as a service or membership fee and 
not as share capital. And, as a result, they view themselves primarily as commodity 
suppliers to PCs (Neti, Govil and Rao 2018). This issue is exacerbated in single-
commodity producer companies which have very 
few interactions with their members throughout the 
year. One promoting institution added that “in many 
FPCs, farmers see the company as a government 
project and therefore do not see the need for putting 
in their own money”. 
In the early years of PC formation, NGOs typically formed PCs in communities 
where they were already working; in cases where SHGs or farmer interest groups 
already existed, they inducted them as shareholders in PCs. And, in line with their 
broader social objectives, they make business decisions (e.g. about procurement 
price, quality cut-offs), thinking of producers as “beneficiaries”, often influenced 
by their previous work and relationships. The promoters are also forming PCs for 
purposes that do not really require a PC. One NGO formed an FPC just so they can 
keep track of the status of organic certification of individual farmers. Some NGOs 
may also form PCs to meet their programmatic targets.
In contrast to small farmers and NGO promoters, well-to-do farmers and existing 
FPCs which promote new PCs, view producer companies first and foremost as 
business enterprises. Such promoters are inclined to establish relatively strict 
controls on quality, delivery schedules, invest greater capital in value-addition 
facilities and, expect higher returns in the future. They usually focus on revenue 
generation and seek to attract farmers who can invest significant equity for 
business activities. Once these activities are somewhat established, such FPCs 
expand their member base for increasing share capital and (sometimes) social 
inclusion by inducting small farmers at a later stage. One funding agency 
remarked that some traders form FPCs only to avail the 5-year tax break.
Therefore, it is evident that different stakeholders have different normative 
imaginations about the purpose of PCs. Primary producers, despite being 
shareholders, see themselves essentially as suppliers; they do not see 
shareholding bringing any additional value to them. Government and other 
socially-oriented promoters see the aim of the whole endeavour as improving 
incomes of marginalised groups. And, relatively larger commercial farmers see PCs 
as vehicles for pooling capital and aggregating produce to create growth-oriented 
businesses.  Most FPCs seem to be focusing on either the social or the business 
objectives; very few are able to progress on both.
Such differences in the promoting organisations’ imagination and perception 
of the purpose of PCs manifest themselves as differences in priorities and 
operational processes of PCs, which we discuss next.  
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7.2 Sense of Ownership among Shareholders
Almost all shareholders we met claimed that the PC was their company. For 
example, in one PC we visited, the CEO said “50% of producers who sell to us 
understand that they are owners”. And, in most companies, farmers expressed 
variants of “yeh toh hamari hi company hai” (“this is our company”).  However, 
deeper discussions revealed that they did not 
understand what ownership meant. Soon after 
claiming that ‘this is our company’, one shareholder 
in a dairy PC said “this is a government dairy”.  In 
another company, the most “aware” farmer board 
member told us that “this is our company” but 
one hour later also added “We trust [the NGO]; 
our money is secure with them” – by which she meant that she trusted the NGO 
to keep her money safe and not misuse it.”  Another board member said that 
“because we have given them [NGO] money, we can demand accountability,” not 
realizing that they had given money as share capital for the company. 
In several companies, we observed that farmers viewed PCs as vehicles for availing 
different kinds of benefits – they thought that the PC is yet another project of 
the NGO. In one PC, the farmers we talked to were under the impression that 
the share capital was in fact a service fee charged by the promoting NGO. This 
was also evident in the way farmers deferred to the promoting NGO for making 
decisions and did not expect or demand transparency or accountability from 
the NGOs. Farmers did not see the need to understand PC operations or get 
involved in decision-making and expected the NGOs to continue supporting the PC 
indefinitely. In many cases, farmer-shareholders could not distinguish between the 
promoting NGO and the producer company.   
The producers’ perception was partly driven by the nature of relationship with 
NGOs. One stakeholder pointed out that “the role of promoter should be that 
of a ‘dai ’ [midwife] at childbirth. But when NGOs start PCs, they continue to be 
closely involved with them for a long time and are not able to shift to a different 
kind of role.” In our field visits too, we observed that some NGOs which have 
been working with the same community for many years, find it difficult to recast 
previous models of engaging with the communities into new ones. Some of 
them take over the producer company to an extent that the members have little 
understanding of the companies’ activities and decisions even after several years.  
Our study revealed that in most cases, it was the nature of shareholders’ 
everyday transactions with the PC which was driving their perception of the 
company.  In some cases, we found that producer-owners thought of the PC as a 
service provider of seeds, fertilizers, market linkage services, etc.  In cases where 
producer-owners were also involved in PC operations, they viewed the PC as an 
employer. 
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Some promoting and resource institutions clearly articulated the uphill task they 
faced. One organisation which had promoted over 15 companies, most of them 
successful, had the following to say about ownership among members: “On a scale 
of 10, our board members are at about 3, while most others are not even at 1. This 
is true even in our oldest companies [7 years old at the time of interview]. It will 
take a lot more awareness building and exposure to get them out of a ‘beneficiary’ 
mindset.” This organisation had developed benchmarks for each business 
function, and a detailed plan of how and when to hand over responsibility for 
each function. Another promoting institution which had promoted over 50 PCs 
commented that it may not even be possible to instil a sense of ownership 
among all shareholders: “In a company with 5000 members, ownership can be 
built among 100-200 members, not in everyone”.  
They also pointed out that a feeling of ownership is 
based on both emotional connect and transactional 
services on a regular basis; it doesn’t develop out of 
occasional transactions. 
Thus, contrary to common belief, our study shows 
that a sense of ownership among producer-
shareholders is not arising automatically from 
having a financial stake in PCs. In general, producer 
cum shareholders of PCs are simultaneously owners, buyers of inputs, suppliers 
of producer, investors and in some cases also employees. While, in principle, 
shareholders are owners, in reality, their relationship with the company is 
complex and multi-faceted, and the primary relationship determines their 
perception of the company.  
The feeling of ownership was also influenced by frequency of transactions and 
interactions with the producer company. In dairy PCs, with daily interaction, the 
board members expressed a slightly higher level of ownership than in companies 
with once-a-year interactions.  Recognizing this, some promoters were trying 
different approaches in order to increase the 
frequency of transactions and increase centrality of 
FPCs in the lives of producers:  procuring multiple 
commodities from producers, offering crop 
insurance, or even selling household provisions to 
their members.  The last one appears to be working 
well for PCs in ‘remote’ areas. 
In contrast, a sense of ownership among shareholders was evident in a few 
of the companies we visited. For example, in seven PCs across four states 
comprising largely of highly educated farmers (some of whom spoke to us partly 
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in English), there was a clear sense of ownership 
and imagination of PCs as business entities.  We also 
noticed gender differences in this context:  In one 
company, we observed that while women members 
were unclear about the purpose and idea of a 
producer company, the male members articulated 
clear ideas regarding the potential of the company 
and their role as owners. This was not surprising, 
given the lower opportunities for exposure and 
learning that rural women usually have due to local 
patriarchal norms. 
In summary, the directors and shareholders of producer companies are largely 
unware of the workings of companies, their obligations and responsibilities, 
and display very low levels of ownership. In the long run, such a lack of sense 
of collective ownership threatens organizational sustainability of FPCs.  This 
is particularly important because FPCs are conceptualised as local institutions 
contributing to larger goals of social and economic empowerment of marginalized 
groups.
7.3 Importance of Business Acumen
As business entities, producer companies need to be commercially viable. 
Successful businesses need to have not only the ability to manage business 
operations well, but also to identify business opportunities, make good strategic 
decisions and understand business risks.  
Agricultural businesses generally require large volume of operations to become 
profitable. However, the scale of operations of most PCs remains limited over time 
and, as pointed out in Chapter 5, their paid-up capital continues to be small even 
after many years.  They incur losses year after year, resulting in erosion of paid-up 
capital. 
Previous studies attribute the small scale and unprofitability of most PCs mainly 
to inadequate capital, problems with cash flow, product quality issues, poor 
inventory management, overhead costs, and lack of skills for developing feasible 
business plans and managing the business. (Christie and Prasad 2017, Sastry 2017, 
Singh and Singh 2013, Govil 2018).
Our study shows that there are two additional important contributors, namely 
the normative imagination (discussed above) and weak business acumen of 
PC promoters and board of directors (discussed here). In fact, the normative 
imagination of PCs influences stakeholders’ views about the importance of 
business acumen in influencing the viability of PCs.
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One funding agency pointed out that because producer company boards do 
not understand the nature of business risks, they are unable to make informed 
choices. Another resource institution highlighted that “the biggest issue is that 
FPCs are not led by entrepreneurs ”. 
Producer companies are dependent on promoters 
for identifying and evaluating business opportunities, 
raising capital, conceptualising and operationalising 
the business, compliance, basic management skills, 
and governance. In most FPCs we visited, there 
was no dedicated or professionally-trained CEO: In some cases, the board was 
acting as the de-facto management of the company, while in other cases, the 
NGO played this role.  Thus, the success of the PCs depended on the business 
competence of their promoters and board members.
Yet, many promoters establish PCs without first conducting a sound analysis of the 
business opportunities and risks in the local context. They tend to underestimate 
the operational complexity and the cost of running a viable business, and 
experiment with different approaches and strategies. One promoter admitted 
this challenge: "This is a business, not a charity but most of our staff are not from 
business side." As a result, they are unable to fully grasp the implications for 
operational and capital requirements, and often fail to institute strong compliance 
and governance processes. One promoter acknowledged that the high turnover 
companies  are usually ones which are self-promoted.
We observed that farmers faced the prospect of additional financial losses in cases 
where the promoters had encouraged them to undertake untested activities such 
as switching to different crops or unfamiliar value addition activities or products. 
Such promoters inadvertently exposed small and marginal farmers to greater risk, 
which was contrary to their own objectives. This is particularly worrisome because 
most PCs formed by socially-oriented promoters have small and marginal farmers 
as their members.
Producer companies need an infusion of business expertise and acumen either 
by the promoters themselves or through external entities. Such “surrogate 
entrepreneurship” – to borrow Sanjiv Phansalkar’s term (Phansalkar 2020) – can 
increase a young producer company’s potential for achieving long-term viability.  
For instance, one organisation is trying to pair social entrepreneurs with farmer 
producer companies with the aim of benefiting both sets of enterprises. Another 
approach to bring business skills to producer companies is to utilise a two-tier 
model (described in Chapter 5), where the market-facing company, not only 
provides market linkage and value addition but also provides surrogate business 
management support to supplier PCs. In fact, one promoter agreed that "any 
startup requires a gestation period of 5-10 years."
We found that having an assured buyer or a proven operational blueprint can 
sometimes overcome the lack of business acumen in producer companies. For 
example, some dairies whose (almost) entire milk production was being purchased 
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by Mother Dairy at reasonable rates, were able to achieve substantial scale and 
profitability within the first year of operations. In these cases, Mother Dairy was 
acting as the top-tier market-facing entity for local dairies.  
In general, while strong business acumen and management skills do not 
guarantee success, their absence often results in losses. If producer companies 
accumulate losses year after year, it results in the erosion of farmers’ share capital 
over time. This poses a difficult question: Who should absorb the losses: Should it 
be small and marginal producers, the promoters, or the state?
7.4 Importance of Enabling Ecosystem
No businesses work in isolation; they build their operations on enabling 
regulations and by leveraging network of other businesses providing various kinds 
of infrastructure and services.  Both of these are weak in the case of producer 
companies.
In our study, we found that PCs trying to avail of benefits under government 
schemes, had limited success. This was partly due to lack of awareness among 
local / state government and bank officials about the concept of PCs and lack of 
clarity about eligibility of FPCs for schemes available to cooperatives. For example, 
a few FPCs had obtained licence to procure agricultural produce under Price 
Stabilisation Fund at minimum support prices (MSP). However, one FPC had to 
terminate procurement within the first week after it realised that it is required to 
pay producers within 72 hours while it would get paid only after 30 days. This was 
a PC comprising mostly small farmers and did not have enough working capital to 
continue procurement. The CEO of the FPC also lamented that many government 
officials they interacted with did not know what an FPC was and therefore they 
(the FPC) had to produce copies of the Producer Companies Act 2002, guidelines 
for PC registration and circulars mentioning eligibility of PCs for government 
schemes to convince the officials.
In addition to government ecosystem, PCs also need to be able to rely on a 
network of other businesses for their operations.  A few PCs in our study were 
able to outsource processing and packaging activities to third parties (typically 
private limited companies). The presence of such local business helped them 
overcome the need for substantial capital investment and in-house expertise. 
However, many PCs are located in ‘remote’ areas with under-developed 
infrastructure and business ecosystem. In case of PCs which were part of a two-
tier structure, the top-tier companies were able to connect supplier PCs with a 
business ecosystem. 
A local business ecosystem and enabling provisions in government schemes are 
essential for ensuring that PCs operate efficiently and profitably and achieve scale. 
One example of an attempt to address this challenge can be seen in the 2018 FPO 
Policy of Government of Odisha. The policy specifies that FPOs are eligible for 
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all schemes and programmes available to cooperatives and individual farmers. 
It suggests instituting a ‘Single Window Clearance System’ for issue of licenses 
for trade in inputs, production, processing, distribution of seeds and saplings. It 
designates the Department of Horticulture as the coordinating resource institution 
which will also house an Information and Support Centre for FPOs in the state 
(Govt. of Odisha 2018).
Rather than expecting producer companies to succeed as stand-alone companies 
despite all odds, it is advisable to enable their success by simultaneously funding 
and developing a business ecosystem and an enabling regulatory framework.  
Although this is difficult to achieve in ‘remote’ and under-developed parts of 
the country, it is essential for the success of producer companies.  Policies and 
interventions which ignore this aspect are likely to experience limited success. 
7.5 Weak Internal Governance   
For long-term sustainability of member-based institutions, it is important to have 
strong and transparent governance mechanisms. This is all the more important 
because FPCs work with the limited savings of small producers who are already 
vulnerable. 
Good internal governance would result in timely filing of compliance documents, 
clear articulation and delegation of roles and responsibilities, process clarity 
regarding decision-making, awareness of key operational details such as amount 
of loans, turnover, number of shareholders, etc.  However, this was weak in most 
companies we visited. For example, many board members did not know whether 
or not they had a CEO, the turnover of their companies or the amount of the loans 
taken.  Many board members were managing operations at a village level, but 
were unclear about their company’s broader activities whether in other villages or 
in terms of market linkages. One company admitted not holding Annual General 
Body meetings, even though it is mandated by law to do so.  
Many board members were not clear that the CEO 
appointed by the promoting NGO was accountable 
to them and not to the NGO.  In one case, the CEO 
of a company held multiple positions as Managing 
Director of the PC, as head of a ‘sister’ SHG 
federation with significant overlap in membership, 
and as a consultant to a government organisation for promotion of producer 
companies. However, in our discussions it became evident that he failed to 
recognize the conflicts of interest inherent in holding such overlapping positions.
The prevalence of weak governance in producer companies is not surprising 
given their capability gaps and low sense of ownership. For most small farmers 
(regardless of gender), we found that their understanding of how a company 
is supposed to function and their own role and rights as a shareholder was 
very limited. For example, most shareholders did not fully comprehend the 
implications of major decisions taken by FPCs or their promoters, such as, setting-
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up processing units or taking large loans. They did not seem to know that they 
have the right to see the annual financial statements of their FPC or know how to 
interpret them. 
Even day-to-day transactions of a company can be daunting for those who have 
not directly engaged with formal institutions previously. The chairman of the 
board of a PC narrated his journey as follows: “When the promoting institution 
came here and talked about starting a PC, I thought how can there be a company 
in a village? Companies are there only in cities. When I transferred money through 
RTGS for the first time [for buying urea in bulk], I couldn’t sleep all night. Would the 
money go to IFFCO or would it would go somewhere else? This is not my money. 
If something goes wrong, will I go to jail? We also made many mistakes in filling 
out cheques. But now I know that money will not go to a wrong account because 
banks check everything”. This was a small farmer in the rural block of a state 
capital who was educated and well-informed. However, due to lack of experience, 
he needed time to develop confidence in his ability to discharge his responsibilities 
as a board member. 
Producer company boards are required to have 5-15 members with at least 80% of 
them being producer-shareholders. Board members have fiduciary responsibilities 
and obligations such as those arising due to default on loans or financial 
irregularities.  To develop the capacity of producer-directors and enhance their 
participation, most promoters conduct training and capacity building programmes 
and provide on-going support to board members; however, such efforts need to 
be strengthened further. The Producer Companies Act 2002 also has a provision 
for an Expert Director to strenghten the board of a PC. However, it appears that 
this provision is under-utilised. In two-tier structures, we found that this challenge 
was partially overcome by the hand-holding support that the market-facing 
company provided to its suppliers PCs in establishing and monitoring governance 
processes.  
While such hand-holding can help a producer company adhere to good 
governance practices, there is also a larger regulatory concern related to PC 
shareholders. Shareholders in producer companies are not protected by the usual 
mechanisms available to shareholders of other 
types of companies: Securities and Exchange Board 
of India (SEBI) protects shareholders of publicly 
traded companies by requiring compliance with 
regulations including good governance practices, 
avoidance of conflicts of interests, etc. On the 
other hand, investors in private companies usually 
invest in companies where they have personal or 
professional connections and believe them to be competent and trustworthy. But 
PC shareholders have neither SEBI protection nor first-hand detailed knowledge 
of the business; their knowledge is usually limited to production and procurement 
related activities of the PC. Thus PC shareholders fall through regulatory gaps and 
are particularly at risk from intentional or unintentional negligence and oversight. 
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Therefore, PC shareholders should be recognized as a separate category 
whose rights must be protected through stronger governance and regulatory 
mechanisms through amendment of relevant sections of the Companies Act 2013. 
This is particularly urgent because the number of PC shareholders has already 
crossed 4 million producer-shareholders across more than 7374 PCs. 
There is a third aspect which requires greater 
attention as well: namely, financial relationships 
between PCs and ‘sister’ Self-Help Groups (SHGs). 
In our interviews, we came across cases where 
SHGs were shareholders in PCs (which is allowed 
by the Producer Companies Act 2002); in several 
other cases, many individual members of SHGs 
are shareholders in the PC. In fact, 10 out of 24 
companies we interviewed had their origins in 
women’s SHGs; many of these are women-only PCs while others have included 
men also as shareholders.
Such close association of PCs with SHGs can lead to blurring of institutional 
boundaries and possibility of risky financial transactions between the two. In our 
interviews, we came across several instances of SHG Federations lending large 
amounts of funds to ‘sister’ PCs with some overlap of membership and /or board 
members. It is not surprising that PCs, which are struggling to access loans from 
banks, view SHG savings as idle funds generating no returns and the prospect of 
borrowing working capital from sister SHG federations seems very attractive1. SHG 
federations are membership based organisations and, as such, are expected to 
lend only to member groups and not to external parties. Technically, a PC is not a 
member of an SHG federation and therefore not eligible for borrowing from the 
federation. However, the overlap in membership between an SHG federation and 
its sister PC is very significant in many cases, and therefore lending to a PC feels 
like lending to their own members and thus seems justified.  
In fact, the overlap in membership opens up the possibility of intentional and 
unintentional misuse of SHG savings. The SHG members may not be aware that 
they may be violating the provisions of the Act under which the federation is 
registered2. The head of one PC which had borrowed funds from its sister SHG 
federation claimed that ‘even those members who were not members of the FPC 
“were not troubled by this”.  However, as with most such members, they may not 
have been aware that the loaned funds could be at risk of default if the PC incurs 
repeated losses. In cases where the directors/ board members of the two entities 
(PC and SHG federation) are the same, there is also scope for intentional misuse.  
SHG savers are already highly vulnerable and may not be in a position to evaluate 
1 As of March 31, 2018, 87.44 lakh SHGs had total savings of Rs. 19,592 crore with banks 
(NABARD 2018).
2 Most unregistered SHGs and SHG federations follow standard cooperative principles which 
restrict lending only to members.
3 Field Interviews, 2019.
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the risk/return from such loans, and default on such loans only increases their 
precarity. In fact, a few PCs which have borrowed from SHGs have received notices 
from the Ministry of Corporate Affairs asking for explanation and repayment of 
the loans taken from SHGs3.  In the long run, the need for borrowing from SHGs 
and federations could be minimised if PCs have easier access to loans from banks. 
In summary, there are three broad areas where greater oversight and hand-
holding is vital: Firstly, producer companies need extended support for developing 
strong internal governance processes for day-to-day operations and regulatory 
compliance. Secondly, producer companies who are borrowing funds from 
affiliated SHG federations should be careful about legal ramifications of such 
borrowing.  Thirdly, policy-makers should consider appropriate regulation to 
protect rights of producer company shareholders as they are a vulnerable group. 
7.6 Onerous Compliance Requirements 
As per the Producer Companies Act 2002, PCs are treated as private limited 
companies and therefore the compliance requirements for PCs are the same 
as those for all private limited companies in India. Most PCs struggle to meet 
compliance requirements such as audited financials and GST returns, due to 
lack of awareness, funds, expertise and infrastructure. Very few board members 
we interviewed were aware of the compliance requirements for their respective 
companies. In most cases, the promoting institutions were taking care of filing 
compliance documents on behalf of the PCs.  
Furthermore, formation of a PC imposes compliance related financial burden on 
shareholders. The cost of filings can range from Rs. 0.5 to 2.0 lakh annually, which 
is quite high for fledgling PCs4. 
Even greater burden arises from capabilities 
required for regulatory filings.  While farmers can 
hire accountants for filing audited returns, other 
compliance requirements create greater challenges. 
For example, PCs have to e-file KYC (Know Your 
Customer) forms for each board member, including 
a live video capture of the director for physical verification5. The Ministry of 
Corporate Affairs also requires all companies to geo-tag the location of their 
registered office6.  Such rules and regulations require company directors to 
have technological expertise and basic knowledge (e.g. of latitude, longitude, 
geo-tagging, etc.) as well as access to relevant infrastructure such as computers, 
smartphones and reliable internet connectivity.
4 This includes cost of registration (which depends on amount of authorised capital), periodical 
filings, financial audits, and other statutory requirements.
5 Under Rule 12A of ‘Companies (Appointment and Qualification of Directors) Fourth Amendment 
Rules, 2018’.
6 Under ‘Companies (Incorporation) Amendment Rules 2019’, with effect from 20 February 2019.
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While such measures are intended to weed out shell companies and ghost 
directors and deter fraud, they create an inordinate burden on small producers. 
It is difficult to imagine semi-literate women board-members in a tribal district 
of Madhya Pradesh being able to comply with such regulatory requirements. In 
such companies, NGO personnel take care of these requirements with minimal 
involvement and knowledge of board members.  Even companies with more 
aware and better educated CEOs find this difficult.  For example, one such 
company’s CEO mentioned that when he received the circular requiring geo-
tagging their offices, he had no idea what that meant. He reached out personally 
to the resource person who had helped them establish the company (the 
promoting institution had completed the 3-year project period and was no longer 
proactively supporting the PC).  When asked what 
he will do for such notifications in the future, he 
responded, “I will keep contacting him [the resource 
person], as long as he is there, regardless of where 
he works.”  Another CEO pointed out that “There is 
same requirement for us as for Narayan Murthy [the 
founder of Infosys Technologies].  The government 
must simplify rules for us.”
These examples highlight the need to provide producer companies some relief 
from statutory compliance requirements in the initial years without diluting 
them in the long run. Incidentally, in its recent publications, NABARD has also 
recommended relaxation of some statutory compliances for PCs during the initial 
10 years “so as to help them adjust with the regulatory business environments and 
stabilise business operations under ease of doing business” (NABARD 2019).  An 
example of this can be found in FPO policy of Government of Odisha (2018) which 
suggests concessions on registration charges and stamp duty. Another possible 
relief measure could to be allow producer companies to submit verification and 
compliance materials off-line and in paper form, negating the need for reliable 
internet connections. Such approaches would not weaken the compliance 
requirements yet make it easier for producer companies, especially those in 
‘remote’ parts of the country.
7.7 Summary and Recommendations
There is a genuine need to promote producer companies of small producers 
which have the potential to succeed.  If, during promotion of most PCs, business 
aspects are not prioritised on par with social objectives, it impacts producers’ 
sense of ownership, operational decisions, business viability as well as strength of 
self-governance and compliance. If we wish producer companies to reach their full 
potential, we need to figure out a way to enable PCs owned by small producers to 
become successful enterprises in the long run. 
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First, because PCs work with the limited savings of small producers who are 
already vulnerable, it is important to institute strong and transparent governance 
processes to ensure long-term organisational sustainability. PCs should develop a 
strong board capable of informed decision-making and discharging their fiduciary 
responsibilities. The governance mechanisms must be also designed to protect 
the rights of farmer-shareholders, since they are at risk from the consequences 
of intentional or unintentional mismanagement. Therefore, we recommend that 
interests of FPC shareholders be protected through regulatory mechanisms by 
amending relevant sections of the Companies Act, 2013.  
Second, the onerous compliance requirements for PCs should be simplified 
keeping in the mind the context and capabilities of small producers. This could be 
done by amending company regulations to allow exemptions for PCs from certain 
requirements and/or creating PC specific rules. 
Third, even after multiple years of operations, most PCs continue to be dependent 
on their promoters for strategic, financial and operational management, as well as 
governance and regulatory compliance. Therefore, it is important for promoters 
to bring in management / advisors with strong business acumen who can guide 
a novice PC in improving farmer incomes while minimizing their exposure to risk. 
For PCs to become independent of promoting institutions, they must explicitly aim 
to develop a clear sense of ownership among shareholders and establish strong 
internal governance mechanisms. 
Fourth, PCs need a reliable ecosystem of funders, business partners and a 
regulatory framework. Key government departments should be familiarised 
with the concept of PCs. Policy makers should explicitly include PCs in relevant 
government schemes and issue circulars to the departments to this effect. The 
government should also ensure that FPCs receive payment for MSP procurement 
quickly, thus reducing their working capital requirements. Local entrepreneurs 
and companies should be encouraged and supported in creating a reliable 
business ecosystem locally to provide services for storage, transport, accounting, 
processing, etc., especially the development of accredited storage facilities with 
warehouse receipts system which would enable FPCs to get advances against 
deposited inventory. 
Fifth, as pointed out above, producer companies need to go beyond a 
transactional relationship with producers and inculcate an individual and collective 
sense of ownership. It is important for producer companies’ stakeholders to 
develop a shared vision for the future, including clear long-term objectives for 
improving small producers’ incomes and minimizing their risks. 
In summary, there is a need to clearly recognize producer companies as 
businesses of small producers with long term financial and social objectives, 
rather than mere recipients of various benefits. Stakeholders should view farmers 
as the true owners and design interventions and policies accordingly.  However, 
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since farmers’ capability to act as business owners is a real constraint, creative 
solutions are required to address this. While some stakeholders suggest increasing 
the duration of support to beyond the 3-year duration of typical projects, we 
suggest exploring a two-tier model of operation where the top-tier company 
can step into the role of a mentoring and capacity building institution in place of 
resource institutions. And, since stakeholders’ normative imagination affects all 
aspects of promotion, support and functioning of PCs, it is important to develop a 
shared normative imagination of producer companies as business entities of small 
producers which can grow and eventually function independently.
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8. Way Forward and 
Recommendations
Well-run and stable producer companies have the potential to improve farmers’ 
incomes and reduce their exposure to economic risk. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that government and non-government organisations are increasingly viewing 
them as essential components of their long-term vision and plans. PCs already 
cover over 4.3 million small producers in the country, and the central government 
has announced a plan to promote 10,000 more producer organisations over the 
next five years. 
If done well, such an effort could result in producer companies covering close to 
10 million producers, or about 10% of all agricultural households in the country. 
Since most of these PCs are promoted by government institutions and social 
sector organisations, and pro-actively include small and marginal producers, this 
can have a tremendous impact on their livelihoods and well-being.
7374 producer companies have been registered in the country as of March 31, 
2019, majority of which have been promoted in the last 4 years. 6926 companies 
have an active status of registration, of which about 92% are in the farm sector. 
For every 100,000 agricultural workers in India, there are 2.6 farmer producer 
companies. There is a substantial skew in their geographical distribution:  More 
than half these companies are in just 4 states, namely, Maharashtra, Uttar 
Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Madhya Pradesh. Nearly one-fourth of the producer 
companies can be found in just twenty districts indicating a considerable skew in 
the promotion efforts. Many districts with a large number of farmers hardly have 
any producer companies. 
Producers have contributed a total of Rs. 860 crore towards share capital in 
producer companies. The average paid-up capital in producer companies varies 
from a few thousand to several lakhs across states. Only 90 out of 6926 active 
producer companies have paid-up capital of Rs 50 lakh or more, whereas 86% 
have paid-up capital of less than 10 lakh.  For most companies, paid-up capital 
does not seem to grow significantly with age:  Among PCs which are 10 years or 
older, 59% continue to have paid-up capital of less than Rs 10 lakh.  In fact, 49% 
of active producer companies have a paid-up capital of just Rs. 1 lakh or less. 
Such low amounts of capital limits producer companies’ ability to expand their 
operations and turnover. 
The Producer Companies Act 2002 envisions PCs as businesses with a potential 
to grow and eventually stand on their own. However, most PCs face multiple 
challenges such as small number of shareholders, low procurement volumes, sub-
scale operations, limited value addition capabilities, poor market linkages, inability 
to attract talent and lack of strategic thinking and planning. These challenges are 
partly a result of divergence in stakeholders’ normative imagination regarding 
the purpose of PCs. This imagination ranges from a government project, a non-
exploitative service provider, a for-profit business entity to a local institution of 
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small producers. The normative imagination impacts the importance stakeholders 
give to the need for business acumen, enabling ecosystem, internal governance 
and compliance mechanisms and the nature and duration of support required. 
It is important to be aware of these challenges and considerations in envisioning, 
promoting and supporting PCs. With this in mind, we propose a guiding 
framework and recommend approaches to address issues affecting the overall 
health of PCs.
8.1 Promote Two-tier, Multi-commodity, Value-adding PCs 
We recommend the promotion of producer companies in a two-tier model 
(comprising multiple supplier PCs and a market-facing company) at a block or 
district level, collectively handling multiple-commodities and value-addition and 
marketing (see Figure 8.1).
Figure 8.1 Companies, their functions and relationships in proposed two-tier model 
Individual farmers own shares in their respective 
supplier PC as well as the market-facing PC
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A two-tier structure allows division of responsibilities between supplier and 
market-facing companies: procurement from producers and primary grading and 
sorting can be handled by the supplier PCs while higher level value-addition can 
be done by the market-facing company. This arrangement relaxes the capital and 
talent requirements in supplier PCs and instead, concentrates them at the market-
facing company, for the benefit of all PCs in the two-tier system. This system is 
well-suited for better business management, generating higher volumes and 
setting up stronger processes for internal governance and compliance.  
A two-tier model also facilitates procurement and 
value-addition of multiple commodities better than a 
single-tier model. PCs handling multiple commodities 
are typically in a better position than those handling 
only single commodities (with the exception of 
dairies). Procurement of multiple commodities 
ensures better capacity utilisation of resources. It 
also enables companies to engage in more frequent 
transactions with members, which builds familiarity 
and contributes to higher volumes. This also reduces risks arising from moral 
hazard common in collective efforts, and improves producer loyalty by increasing 
PCs’ relevance in the lives of producers.  Producer companies in the two-tier 
model have to be collectively strategic in the choice of commodities procured and 
may have to include only those commodities which are produced by the members 
in sufficient volumes to reach break-even for business profitability in the long run.
It is desirable to have supplier PCs of a minimum reasonable size of membership 
(say, 500 shareholders each) so that they are able to initiate trading operations1. In 
fact, before registering new PCs, resource institutions should ensure that there is a 
clear plan for inducting adequate number of shareholders, procurement volumes 
and linkages to geographically focused market-facing companies in a two-tier 
structure. 
The market-facing companies act as assured buyers 
for the produce of supplier PCs, providing them 
operational and financial stability.  Moreover, 
they can undertake delayed marketing and value 
addition to generate higher returns for producers. 
They can build common brands (if required), 
establish sales relationships with larger buyers 
and negotiate favourable prices for the benefit of 
all producer-members. Market-facing companies 
will require significant infusion of capital, which 
can be facilitated by modifying the Producer Companies Act 2002 to allow PCs 
to raise external capital through a different class of shares with no voting rights, 
and with restrictions on the maximum amount of equity per external investor.  
Alternatively, the market-facing companies can be registered as social enterprises 
1 This will also ensure more effective use of government funds for promotion of PCs (which 
currently amounts to approximately Rs. 30 lakh per PC).
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in the form of private limited companies. In both cases, it is vital that supplier PCs 
and individual farmers own a significant stake in the market-facing company and 
have strong representation on its board to ensure alignment with interests of 
small producers. It is important for market-facing companies to be invested in the 
success of supplier PCs.  
The two-tier model makes it easier to provide 
additional services to members through the market-
facing company, such as bulk procurement of inputs, 
crop insurance, and warehousing (with potential to 
be linked with a warehouse receipts arrangement). 
This is also applicable for linking with government 
schemes such as procurement at minimum support 
prices. They can also undertake certification efforts 
and advocacy on behalf of group PCs. With their 
better ability to attract well-trained talent, market-facing companies can hand-hold 
and mentor supplier PCs in business management and decision-making. They can 
also help build the capacity of supplier PCs in strengthening internal governance 
and compliance through trainings on rights and responsibilities of shareholders 
and board-members. This model also allows for cost-sharing by enabling some 
services to be offered on payment basis to supplier PCs, where appropriate.  
As can be inferred from the above, our imagination of the two-tier model 
recasts most existing PCs as supplier PCs and envisages adding a top-tier multi-
commodity value-adding market facing entity at the block or district level. 
The proposed model is designed keeping in mind the large number of poorly 
performing companies; exceptional companies which are performing well can 
continue to operate independently or evolve into market-facing companies. 
Establishing and incubating such a system requires a very different set of 
capabilities for promotion and support. To help create such structures, policy 
makers and practitioners should adopt a two-pronged PC promotion strategy: the 
first is to continue the promotion of supplier PCs by 
NGOs and other resource institutions who are good 
at producer mobilisation and have ground-level 
knowledge of local context. The second is to bring in 
business expertise from social enterprises, start-up 
incubators, funding agencies and entrepreneurship-
oriented fellowships to establish a smaller number of 
market-facing companies with adequate capital and 
skilled talent. 
It is pertinent to note here that there are certain limitations to this model.  For 
example, there is little incentive for the top-tier company to build capacity of 
supplier PCs beyond compliance and rudimentary aggregation and processing 
functions.  It may make decisions without consulting producers or keeping them 
informed.  This possibility can be mitigated by requiring significant ownership 
and strong board representation of supplier PCs in the top-tier company.  Despite 
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these risks, the two-tier model offers a better chance for producer companies to 
be successful compared to the current stand-alone model. 
By focusing business development efforts on a smaller number of top-tier PCs, 
such a two-tier approach has the added advantage of negating the need for 
building business capabilities of thousands of grass-roots PCs (which is turning 
out to be very challenging). The two-tier model also offers a path for NGOs to exit 
and for the top-tier entity to take over the role of mentoring and supporting the 
supplier PCs. In this model, support for PCs is provided by different entities at 
different times in their lifecycle. It is important to note that the top-tier company 
will require handholding and mentoring for much longer than supplier PCs, 
perhaps 7-10 years.
The multi-commodity two-tier model offers scope to strengthen member loyalty 
and ownership. Over a period of time, it also has the potential to shift the 
producers’ normative imagination of PCs from being service providers to business 
entities owned by them. Such a two-tier model is achievable and practical:  Many 
successful companies are already working in variants of this model and some of 
them were part of our study2.
8.2 Address the Geographical Skew
There is a substantial disparity in the number of PCs 
across districts in India with numbers ranging from 
0 to 185. Future PC promotion efforts should aim to 
correct this skew keeping in mind the original intent 
behind the promotion of PCs. It is also important 
for policy makers to ensure that even the smallest 
producers have the opportunity to be part of a PC. 
One way to do this is to link the target number of 
PCs to the number of small producers taking into 
account the major commodities produced and the 
geographic area of each district.  They should prioritise promotion of PCs in the 
100 most backward districts in the country (now termed as ‘aspirational districts’).
In districts and blocks with large number of existing sub-scale PCs, it may be 
prudent to consolidate multiple PCs into a few reasonably sized companies with 
higher number of members and more share capital per company. Consolidation 
across multiple commodities will also help utilize the same capital for multiple 
procurement cycles of different commodities at different times during the year. 
A stronger balance sheet and increased business activities would also improve 
the likelihood of consolidated PCs attracting formal sector loans. For sub-scale 
PCs where the above measures are not relevant, promoting institutions could 
consider, as a last recourse, closing down producer companies with little business 
potential which are eroding shareholder equity and transfer the remaining funds 
back to the producers.
2 In exceptional cases, companies with certain characteristics (e.g. very large dairies, export-
oriented commodities, leadership with strong business acumen) can succeed outside this model.
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Further, in these districts with large numbers of PCs, focus should be on 
establishing and promoting market-facing companies rather than promoting 
new PCs. 
In some cases, we may find that there is no need to establish PCs, especially 
when the primary objective is to avail of bulk discounts on inputs or services 
under specific government schemes.  In such cases, farmer groups may be 
better alternatives, as formation of groups does not impose onerous corporate 
compliance requirements or any pressure for achieving a minimum membership 
and capital.  
8.3 Refining Policy and Regulation
The Producer Companies Act 2002 was pioneering in combining the principles 
of co-operation and mutuality with the operational benefits of a company. This 
vision was boosted by multiple schemes for promoting large numbers of producer 
companies and for supporting them through equity grant and credit guarantee 
schemes. Below, we highlight a few specific areas which can be strengthened to 
enable more producer companies to succeed. 
 
Availability of Data for Analysis and Regulation 
We suggest that a separate identifier be created in the Company Identification 
Number (CIN) for producer companies. Currently, producer companies have 
the same letters (‘PTC’) in the CIN just like any other private limited company3. 
Creating a new marker in the CIN schema to designate producer companies would 
make it easier to track and regulate them, especially as the number of PCs grows 
significantly over the next few years.
Secondly, data on producer companies should be made available to researchers 
and practitioners to better inform the design of future policy and interventions. 
Access to reliable data is also important for regulatory purposes for introducing 
differentiated regulatory requirements for different categories of companies. 
Rethinking Compliance Requirements
Compliance requirements for producer companies should be re-examined 
keeping in mind the context and capabilities of small producers. Regulations can 
be modified either by amending company regulations to allow exemptions for 
PCs from certain requirements and/or by creating PC specific rules.  Ministry of 
Corporate Affairs (MCA) should explore the possibilities of differential compliance 
requirements for PCs and other types of private companies such as lower 
3 MCA assigns a Company Identification Number (CIN) to every registered company. For 
example, the CIN of largest producer company Sri Vijaya Visakha Milk Producers Company Ltd. 
Is ‘U15209AP2006PTC048708’. The letters ‘PTC’ indicate the type of company (in this case, a 
private limited company).  The MCA could assign a new code (say, ‘PRC’) to distinguish producer 
companies from other private companies.
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registration and other charges in the initial years. Compliance filings such as 
director registration and geotagging should be simplified and wherever possible 
be allowed to be submitted in paper form.
 
Secondly, given the confusion regarding FPCs borrowing from sister SHGs, 
it is important for MCA to clarify its position on its legality and issue relevant 
notifications. If it is felt that PCs should be allowed to borrow from SHGs, 
appropriate borrowing limits and monitoring mechanisms should be put in place 
in order to protect the interests of SHG savers. Thirdly, as mentioned earlier, 
there are many companies registered as producer companies under the relevant 
sections of the Companies Act, but engaged only in providing various deposit and 
credit services as their primary activity.  To prevent such cases, the government 
should clarify the types of activities which cannot be undertaken by producer 
companies as their primary activities, and take appropriate action for violations.
Linking with Government Schemes
The government should notify that FPCs are eligible for all schemes and 
programmes available to cooperatives and individual farmers, to remove 
confusion among various government departments regarding the applicability 
of schemes (Such notifications have been issued for certain schemes and not for 
others, leading to some confusion). In addition, ensuring that FPCs receive prompt 
payment for MSP procurement would enable FPCs to provide remunerative prices 
to their members and meet their own working capital requirement.  
Stronger Shareholder Protection
The policy should offer protection for shareholders, similar to SEBI’s provisions 
for shareholder protection in publicly traded companies.  Since most small 
producers are neither aware of their rights as shareholders nor the implications of 
financial decisions, it is important to protect their interests through regulation. PC 
shareholders should be recognized as a separate category whose rights must be 
protected through stronger governance and regulatory mechanisms by amending 
relevant sections of the Companies Act 2013. These modifications are needed 
urgently because the number of shareholders in producer companies has already 
crossed 4.3 million and is expected to increase substantially over the next few 
years.
Allowing External Investment
To address the issue of undercapitalisation faced by most PCs, the Producer 
Companies Act 2002 should be modified to enable infusion of external equity 
through a different class of shares with no voting rights. Certain minimum 
requirements such as number of shareholders, capital and turnover can be 
stipulated as eligibility criteria. To minimise the potential for undue influence 
of external investors, some precautions can be taken such as restricting the 
maximum amount of equity per external investor relative to total farmers’ equity.
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Strengthening Promotion and Support of Producer Companies 
To increase capitalisation of PCs of small producers, policy-makers should 
consider providing a 2:1 match for farmers’ equity up to a specified upper limit 
per company to PCs comprising more than 80% small farmers. They should also 
allow matching equity to be disbursed in 3-4 tranches (rather than just 2 tranches) 
so that PCs are able to grow incrementally.  In order to help greater numbers 
of PCs become eligible for matching equity and credit schemes, policy-makers 
should consider creating support structures and organisations to enable small PCs 
prepare and file audited financial statements4.
Recognizing that mobilising producers and nurturing fledgling businesses require 
different kinds of expertise, NABARD, SFAC and other government agencies should 
empanel different kinds of resource institutions who bring such skills. At different 
stages of its life-cycle, a company may need support from different resource 
institutions. Producer companies with more complex operations (such as those 
involved in secondary or tertiary processing) will need hand-holding and capacity 
building for a longer duration than those engaged primarily in trading. In a two-
tier structure, the market-facing companies will benefit from extended multi-year 
business support from different resource institutions and provisions for this can 
be made in relevant schemes.  
 
4 This study focused only on equity and not on debt.
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Table 8.1 Summary of key recommendations based on this study
Category Recommendations
Locations
Model
Commodities
Value addition
Equity capital
• Promote more PCs in districts with larger numbers of small producers, 
  especially in aspirational districts
• Multiple producer companies organised in a two-tier structure at the block 
   or district level
• Supplier PCs: 500+ members, aggregation, grading and sorting
• Market-facing companies: assured buyer for supplier PCs’ produce, delayed 
   marketing, value-addition, marketing and sales
• Supplier PCs and individual farmers should own significant shares and have 
  strong representation on the board of market-facing companies to ensure 
   alignment with producers' interests
• Market-facing companies should be invested in success of supplier PCs
• Multi-commodity (procure commodities produced by members in 
  significant volumes)
• Mostly by market-facing companies
• 2:1 equity match for PCs comprising more than 80% small farmers
• Disburse equity grant in 3-4 tranches to enable incremental growth
• Allow external investment through non-voting shares. Protect social 
  objectives by imposing limits on maximum amount of equity per external 
  investor relative to total equity of farmers
Business acumen 
and expertise
Promoting and 
supporting PCs
Other regulatory
• Bring through market-facing companies, which can hire a competent team
• Market-facing companies are expected to hand-hold supplier PCs 
• Supplier PCs should be promoted by NGOs and other grass-roots 
   organisations
• Market-facing companies should be supported by social enterprises and 
  other organisations with business experience
• Producer companies will require support from different kinds of resource
   institutions at different points in their life-cycle
• Link PCs to government programs and schemes
• Develop a business ecosystem in blocks and districts to provide various 
   business services to PCs
• Create a distinct marker in registration number for producer companies so that 
   they can be tracked and regulated differently
• Simplify compliance filings and allow submission in paper form
• Clarify eligibility for schemes available for cooperatives and individual farmers
• Offer protection for shareholders, similar to SEBI’s provisions for shareholder 
   protection in publicly traded companies
8.4 Concluding Remarks
The Producer Companies Act 2002 was pioneering in combining the principles 
of collective action with the structural benefits of a company. It has enabled 
thousands of companies of small producers to be registered and some of them 
to become successful. The original intent behind promoting producer companies 
was predicated on the belief that such companies would enable small producers 
to pool their capital and establish successful businesses which would eventually 
improve their incomes and reduce risks. Successful PCs also have the potential to 
create jobs and entrepreneurial opportunities for the younger generation. And, as 
member-based institutions, producer companies are inherently embedded in local 
communities and have the potential to go beyond a transactional relationship with 
producers to become strong local institutions of marginalised producers.
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However, in the last 17 years, producer companies have faced an uphill task 
of nurturing and growing their business with limited infrastructure, capability 
and access in remote areas. Our study has identified several challenges such as 
incongruities in stakeholder imaginations, missing sense of ownership among 
producers, undercapitalisation, poor business skills, weak governance and 
compliance and the near absence of an enabling ecosystem in many parts of the 
country. Furthermore, the skew in the geographical spread of these companies 
prevents them from including the most marginalised producers in remote parts 
of the country. It has become clear that nurturing large numbers of financially 
viable producer companies requires greater support and hand-holding.  The 
concept of producer companies may take many years to settle in the imagination 
of rural communities and it may take even longer for them to become truly local 
institutions. Therefore, the recent renewed focus on producer companies by 
policy-makers and practitioners is a welcome step.  
Our study suggests possible mechanisms for addressing the above challenges 
(summarized in Table 8.1). The geographical disparities in PC promotion can 
be addressed by promoting PCs in the most backward districts with the largest 
numbers of small producers. In order to improve the likelihood of PCs’ success, 
we recommend promoting them in two-tier structures with multiple supplier PCs 
working with one market- facing company in each block or district (depending 
on the number of small producers). It would also be advisable to simultaneously 
fund and develop a business ecosystem to support them by encouraging local 
entrepreneurship. Such an approach allows producer companies to attract greater 
capital and skilled talent, and generate higher turnover and member loyalty.  
When combined with strong internal governance it can result in better incomes 
and risk reduction for members.  Policy-makers can support producer companies’ 
growth by enabling external investment through a different class of non-voting 
shares (with appropriate safeguards and limits), providing operational relief by 
simplifying compliance processes, instituting differential regulation, and protecting 
the rights of vulnerable shareholders through appropriate changes in regulation.   
There are already 7374 producer companies registered in India and this number is 
expected to more than double over the next few years, bringing the total coverage 
to about 10% of all agricultural households in India, most of whom are small and 
marginal farmers.  
Producer companies have the dual responsibility of balancing social and business 
objectives. Well-run and stable producer companies have the potential to improve 
farmers’ incomes, reduce their exposure to risk and contribute to social and 
economic empowerment. More than four million small producers (and growing) 
are counting on them! 
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